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This study investigates the relationship between female board and top management 
representation and corporate financial performance (measured i.t.o. ROA), and market 
sentiment (measured i.t.o. Tobin’s Q). Three Western nations (the U.S., the U.K. and Germany) 
and two Asian countries (China and Japan), are considered, specifically with the aim of 
understanding the nature and extent of the relationship in each region individually, and any 
potential differences under different cultural environments. The study period was 2014- 2019 
for the board representation analysis and, due to data constraints, only 2019 for the top 
management analysis. Random effects panel regression was used in the board level analysis 
and a multiple regression model was used to study the top management level impact. The 
results indicate a positive relationship between the performance measures and female 
representation at both the board and top management levels. However, the relationship is not 
statistically significant in the case of the board level analysis, but generally statistically 
significant for the top management analysis. The strength of the mostly positive relationships 
between female representation and the performance measures is generally stronger for the three 
Western countries (particularly for the US and the UK) compared to the two Asian countries, 
which could in part be due to the impact of cultural differences between them. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
Over the last few decades, gender diversity has been an area of increasing focus throughout the 
world. During the 1950s, feminist movements in the US started promoting equal access to 
education for women, and that women should share equal rights to work and promotion as 
males within business and corporates. This implies that corporates should employ and promote 
employees based on merit and qualifications, rather than on gender considerations. These 
movements strongly improved the rights of women within the business world and have 
successfully promoted increased gender-equality across all aspects of life, particularly in 
developed countries. 
Today, one would expect a much more accepting study and work environment for women 
compared to that of the last century. Indeed, the number of women receiving higher education 
and working in corporates have increased. However, the rate of women occupying crucial 
positions in corporates remain problematic1. Over the past 25 years, the number of women and 
men graduated from law school or business school with MBA degrees were equal in Australia 
or the U.S, but only approximately 12% directors in Australian or US firms are female. 
According to Corkery and Taylor (2012), the number of women acting as chairpersons in public 
companies is even lower, being a mere 3%.  
One question that clearly arises considering this situation, is whether greater female 
representation at executive management and/or board level may be beneficial to firms, 
particularly in terms of their profitability, and hence, whether corporates should target greater 
female representation at board level and in top management. For the purposes of this study, 
crucial positions refer to key managerial and highly responsible roles, and in particular senior 
executive management positions and directors. 
The reason that more female leadership may add value to businesses, is the potential 
behavioural differences between women and men in a management context, as diverse mindsets 
may benefit corporates. For example, Garfinkle (2016) has identified that, due to their more 
fact-based approach, males tend to be more task-oriented and directive. This goal- oriented style 
could be highly beneficial when the situation is urgent. Women, on the other hand, generally 
follow a cooperative style, by conducting conversations and active listening (Garfinkle, 2016). 
By pursuing collaboration and encouraging participation, employees may feel more valued in 
 
1 Examples include research performed by Flynn and Adams (2004), Singh et al. (2001), Lam, McGuinnes & 






such situations, and a long- term work relationship may be established based on encouragement 
and understanding. Although the style of leadership may vary across genders, both should be 
considered relevant, as they may be complementary, and/or applicable under different contexts. 
In the modern corporate world, both the decisions made at the board and the executive 
management levels ultimately have an impact on firm performance. However, these impacts 
result from two different potential drivers of performance. Thus, the responsibilities of the 
board and executive management are different. While the board is responsible for the vision, 
mission and strategic planning of the business and making major business decisions, executive 
management (including the CEO) makes operational decisions and keeps the board informed 
(Barlow, 2016). Thus, a firm’s board determines its strategic direction and long- term 
development, whereas executive management have to turn strategic plans into action through 
effective execution and the smooth operation of the firm on a daily basis. It can therefore be 
argued that sound strategic decisions made by the board, as well as their effective 
implementation by executive management, may ultimately impact organisational success. 
Therefore, although board and top management have different roles, both potentially play a role 
in firm performance. 
Due to potential behavioural differences, women may improve board strategic decision- 
making and executive management execution because of their different perspectives and 
possible approaches to dealing with decisions and problems. It is possible that this could 
contribute to long-term benefits for firms, including in terms of profitability. Thus, women’s  
detail-orientation and prudence may benefit firms’ operational performance through 
management involvement, and their perceived cooperative leadership style may make 
employees feel valued and motivated. On the basis of these arguments, it could therefore be 
beneficial to investigate the impact on firms of greater female promotion to executive 
management and/or appointment to company boards (i.e., at both decision-making strategic and 
operational levels). 
Further, although women in leadership may potentially benefit corporates from both strategic 
and operational levels, the extent of impact may vary across countries as a result of different 
cultural environments and practices. Thus, culture may function as a mediator of female impact 
on the performance of organisations, depending on whether it inhibits or reinforces female 
influence in high level roles. A good example of this the difference between Asian and Western 
cultures, where for the purpose of this study, China and Japan are taken to as representative 





If a culture is more open-minded, individualistic and free spirited, such as that of the U.S or the 
U.K., it may encourage women to be more outspoken and bolder, as is the perception of their 
male counterparts. Under this culture, women may tend to express their voices freely and be 
more able to raise differing opinions and views. On the other hand, if the culture is not 
supportive of women’s participation in important decisions, or its traditions value reserved 
women, the impact of women’s opinions may be limited. In addition, women may even tend to 
withdraw themselves from such involvement and become tokens on boards or at management 
level. Kanter (1993) explained in his study that female directors may feel more pressured to 
perform due to their “visibility” on a board, and that this could therefore result in worse 
performance and affect firms negatively due to tokenism. Asian culture may be such an 
example. Thus, it is further worth investigating whether the correlation (if any) between female 
representation and firm performance is consistent across different countries with varied cultural 
backgrounds. 
Based on the above arguments, a cross-country comparative analysis between Western (U.S., 
U.K. and Germany) and Asian (China and Japan) nations is performed in this study to analyse 
potential cultural effects on the impact of female top management and board representation. 
Although the relationship between female board membership and firm performance has been 
investigated for some developed nations such as the US, research in this field is very limited, 
including for the Chinese region, perhaps because in China female participation in management 
is a relatively new phenomenon. The cross-country comparison conducted on this study, which 
includes China, has to the author’s knowledge not been done  before. 
Firm performance can be defined in many different ways, but in this study the focus is on 
financial performance measures, as well as on market sentiment towards corporates. According 
to Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015), ROA and Tobin’s Q are good measures of financial 
performance and market sentiment, respectively. Tobin’s Q is a market valuation indicator that 
is an indirect indicator of expected future firm performance, and whether the market believes 
the firm will increase shareholder value in the future. ROA serves as a common accounting 





1.1 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
In view of the above, this study investigates the relationship between female representation in 
business leadership (specifically representation at board level and in executive management) 
and corporate performance, both from the financial performance and market sentiment 
perspectives. It further compares how such an impact may vary across selected countries with 
very different cultural backgrounds and investigates where there are trends in this over time. 
In particular, this study seeks to explore the following questions: 
 
1. Is there a correlation between female board representation and firm performance for the 
listed firms in the countries examined? 
2. Is there an association between female senior management representation and firm 
performance of selected corporates in each selected country? 
3. Does the relationship between female board and senior management representation and firm 
performance differ between selected Asian and Western countries? 
 
 
1.2 Thesis Map 
The remainder of this document is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
both the theoretical base of this research study, as well as empirical evidence from academic 
literature on the topic. This is followed by Chapter 3, which discusses the data and methodology 
used to conduct the research. Next, Chapter 4 discusses the results and their analysis, including 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
There exists a perception that men and women, as a generalisation, tend to think and behave 
differently in certain situations. Thus, it can be argued that greater female representation in 
firms’ senior management may affect their financial and market performance. In addition, 
different cultural value systems may affect women’s behaviour and influence in a corporate 
context, and thus mediate the extent of females’ impact on firms’ performance. This chapter 
outlines the theories, arguments and empirical evidence on gender differences in a business 
context, empirical evidence on the relationship between female representation at senior levels 
in corporates and their financial and market performance, as well as possible cultural effects on 
this. 
2.1 Gender Differences in a Business and Management Context 
Men and women have always been thought of as possessing different characteristics, which 
therefore imply that they may also behave differently in the corporate environment. From a 
psychological perspective, men are generally considered to be more prone to risk-taking and 
being assertive, whereas women tend to be associated with empathy and prudence. 
Thus, for example, Del Giudice (2015: 753) argues that men are more risk-seeking, tough- 
minded, emotionally stable and assertive. Women, on the other hand, are considered to be 
warmer, risk-averse and tender-minded. In addition, women are more associated with feelings 
and emotion, whereas men tend to be more open to abstract ideas. Del Giudice (2015: 754) 
further found that males form competitive groups under an environment with stable hierarchies 
and limited emotional investment requirements. Female groups, on the other hand, tend to be 
more emotion-based, and their competition less confrontational. Lastly, this study found that 
women have superior communication skills compared to men. 
The behavioural differences mentioned above regarding risk-taking is empirically supported by 
the findings of a study by Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016: 193), using an experimental 
approach and a large sample of privately held and publicly traded European companies, 
consisting of 18 European countries from 1999 to 2009, including Germany and United 
Kingdom. It was found that female CEOs tend to make less risky financing and investment 
decisions than male CEOs. Furthermore, risk-taking choices of corporates tend to reduce 
significantly in both economic and statistical manners when transitions from male to female 
CEOs occur. In addition, Fessler (2018) also argued that women tend to have a lower financial 





women (in general) are more prudent and risk-averse than males. Further gender-based 
differences are highlighted by Annis and Nesbitt (2017), who indicate that men follow a fact-
based approach to eliminate options and tend to seek solutions directly, whereas women are 
seen as preferring an intuitive approach in which they first establish an understanding of the 
broader background through perceiving people and events  at a deeper level. 
Similarly, Garfinkle (2016) also argues that men base their decisions on facts, and that this 
approach could be highly beneficial when opportunity is present in a timely manner. However, 
such decisions may lack prudence and caution when risks are involved, or when a softer 
“humane” approach is required. This process may therefore lead males to make rational 
decisions through the effective elimination of issues but could reduce their consideration of 
feelings and emotions. In terms of firm performance, these decisions may bring positive 
financial rewards, but increase a firm’s risk exposure. However, as modern business 
increasingly moves towards a stakeholder orientated approach, as opposed to short term 
profitability only, it may become more important for corporates to be sensitive to other 
emotional factors when considering strategic decisions. 
Thus, women may be more likely to make decisions intuitively through the establishment of an 
understanding of the broader context and impacts, although this approach may cause them to 
personalise issues. This may involve a conversational and cooperative approach, which enables 
women to understand the underlying emotional impact at a deeper level and consider the long-
term internal and external societal effect on business, which could lead to firm decisions that 
attempt to better balance financial and societal factors (Budhwar et al., 2005). 
It has been questioned, however, whether these presumed behavioural differences between the 
genders persists in positions of leadership. Bosak et al. (2004) conducted a study on a sample 
of management students of both sexes from Australia, Germany and India, to estimate the 
person-oriented and task-oriented leadership traits that exist in three stimulus groups, namely 
executives with no gender specification, male executives and female executives. All three 
countries indicated a preference of a less traditional view of leadership. In addition, similar self-
descriptions in terms of person-oriented and task-oriented traits were found for both the male 
and female management students, thus indicating that any differences that may exist between 
the genders may disappear in positions of management. 
This differs from the view of Goh (1991), who found that men tend to perceive themselves as 





career success and advancement than home life, whereas women in general have the opposite 
view. Thus, when women work under male supervisors, they tend to experience lower job 
satisfaction than their male colleagues. 
Bosak et al. (2014) found that a view that a female leadership could be more competent due to 
a higher degree of person-orientation amongst women than men was shared across some 
cultures. Furthermore, Burke and Collins (2001:244) concluded that female leaders tend to lead 
in a more collaborative manner. In their study, female accountants were more likely to indicate 
that they tend to follow an interactive leadership style than males. Some management skills 
found to correlate with success were utilised under this leadership style. In addition, a higher 
perceived effectiveness in both coaching and developing and communicating were found in 
women than men, again based on self-reporting. 
Due to a collaborative and participatory leadership style and greater empathy, women may 
encourage employees and provide greater mental support in the teamwork environment than 
men. This ability to support and motivate employees may help the female managers to achieve 
higher degrees of cooperation from the employees in the workplace. These skills may be more 
relevant in a modern business environment and could ultimately benefit corporates in the long 
term. 
Overall, there may be some fundamental differences between men and women, which could 
result in different but possibly complimentary approaches to situations and decision making. It 
may therefore be beneficial to firms to have access to the different perspectives, approaches and 
skill sets potentially offered by women. Sufficient female participation at various levels of 
organisations may therefore hold benefits that go beyond just moral arguments. 
2.2 Female Leadership Impact on Firm Performance 
In an increasingly complex business world, inputs from different mindsets may be required to 
form a thorough and competitive strategy. Since men and women potentially think differently, 
gender diversity in decision-making roles could be one of the ways to respond to increasingly 
rapid changes.  
Various studies have been conducted, mostly in developed countries, to indirectly test the 
validity of this theory by investigating the relationship between female representation (usually 
at board level) and company results. Although mixed results were found, most published studies 






A range of studies have investigated whether the presence of female directors at board level 
affect company performance. These studies include both cross-country and an individual 
country study. For example, Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015) conducted multi-country 
research using data from 47 countries and 3876 public companies. It was found that firms with 
more female directors tend to achieve better performance in terms of both market (Tobin’s Q) 
and accounting (ROA) measures (Terjesen, Couto & Francisco, 2015). A further cross-country 
study, conducted by the Credit Suisse Research Institute (CSRI) in 2012, investigated the link 
between female board presence and specific firm attributes for 2400 large-cap public 
companies from 2005 to 2011. The study reported that companies with more than one female 
director outperformed those with none by 26% over the six-year period. 
Further, firms with at least one woman on their boards exhibited lower leverage, a faster 
reduction in gearing, a 4% higher return on equity (ROE), a price to book value ratio of a third 
higher, and a higher net income growth in comparison to the firms with no female board 
members (CSRI, 2012). The cross-country evidence above not only appear to support the view 
that gender-diversity at board level may bring financial benefits but indicates that this general 
positive female impact could apply across different cultures. 
At individual country level, the earliest studies in the field mainly focussed on developed 
countries. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) analysed 127 US companies for the period 1993 
to 1998 and found a positive association between board gender-diversity and financial 
measures. In the United Kingdom Trinh et.al (2018) similarly found strong evidence to support 
the positive impact of the female board representation on firm performance in a study of 96 
public firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2006 and 2016. The authors gave 
some credit for this to UK governance initiatives, which have as goal at least a third female 
board representation by the end of 2020.  
Moreover, a study of Chinese listed firms over the period 2000 to 2011 by Luo, Xiang and 
Huang (2017) came to the conclusion that the higher the number of female directors in Chinese 
firms, the lower the levels of real activities manipulation is. Real activities manipulation 
referred to any real adverse economic impact on firm’s profitability and growth in the long term 
due to altering the timing and scale of operations or any investing or financing transactions 
(Luo, Xiang & Huang, 2017). This relationship strengthened with increased female director 
ownership of the firm. 
Apart from the general improvement in financial measures, Bernardi, Bosco and Landry (2014) 





the more female directors on a firm’s board, the more likely it was to appear on recognition lists, 
such as the most ethical or best companies to work for. 
However, some researchers have found evidence that contradict the above findings. Thus, 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) studied US publicly traded firms from 1996 to 2003 and found that 
the average effect of gender diversity could be negative for firms with good corporate 
governance. Similarly, in a study using a sample comprising 92.4% of listed firms on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange, Darmadi (2010) could not find any evidence that female board 
representation is associated with improved levels of firm performance, from both accounting 
(ROA) and market (Tobin’s Q) perspectives 
Although evidence on the relationship between female board representation and company 
performance is mixed, the majority of findings suggest a positive correlation, across a number 
of countries. However, the success of the promotion of gender-diversity on boards depend on 
the level of firm corporate governance and general governance culture in a specific country. 
Further, although most studies have thus far empathized the impact of female board 
representation on firm performance, a comparatively unexplored question is whether female 
involvement at top management level is similarly associated with better firm performance. 
Whereas the board determines firm strategy and influences its long-term plan and its execution, 
top management is responsible for a more detailed execution plan and task- allocation, as well 
as the close monitoring of operations. Theoretically, therefore, both the board and top 
(executive) management should affect the success of the firm. 
Reinert, Weigert and Winnefeld (2016), in a study of all the credit institutions in the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg from 1999 to 2013, found a strong association between the proportion 
of women in top management and organisational performance. From a financial perspective, 
an increase of 10% women in top management increased future expected ROE by 3%. This 
positive relationship was found to be stronger during periods of financial crisis compared to 
normal market conditions.  
Further, organisations were found to be most successful at an optimal ratio of 20% to 40%. 
In a similar study, Dezső and Ross (2008) investigated the relationship between female 
management and market sentiment (provided by Tobin’s Q), using a sample of American 
firms selected from the S&P ExecuComp database for the period 1992 to 2006. It was 
found that less than a third of the largest U.S. firms had any female senior executive, but a 
positive relationship was found between female executives management representation 





A similar trend was discovered for Asian corporates. For example, Liu, Wei and Xie (2014), in 
a study of Chinese listed firms for the period 1999 to 2011, found a stronger positive correlation 
between firm financial performance and female executive directors than the female independent 
directors. This could imply that when women are in top executive positions, they possibly 
contribute more through decision making and directing implementation of key actions, as 
opposed to purely monitoring executives in the roles of non-executive directors. This could 
further imply for women in key managerial positions in Chinese firm, a stronger executive 
impact effect may outweigh their board monitoring impact.  
Similar evidence exists for Japan. Thus, Nakagawa and Schreiber (2014) analysed 745 
Japanese-listed firms in 2014 and found that both the female manager ratio and overall gender 
diversity of the workplace and managerial positions showed a robust positive relationship with 
corporate performance, after controlling for variables such as industry, firm size, capital 
structure, corporate governance and compensation policy. The relationship discovered was 
non-linear, which suggested that the benefit to corporates of increased female  representation at 
managerial level gradually decreases. This could indicate that management gender diversity is 
beneficial to corporates, and not necessarily female representation per se. 
However, not all researchers found evidence of a positive relationship between female 
representation at managerial level and firm performance. For example, on top of claiming a 
positive association between female chairman and firm value, Trinh et.al (2018) has suggested 
a negative link between female CEOs and firm value, after they investigated the value of UK 
FTSE100 stocks from 2006 to 2016.  
Trinh et.al (2018) provided evidence that female directors on board could positively affect the 
firm value (Tobin’s Q). Lam, McGuinness and Vieito (2012) also reported only limited 
evidence between CEO gender and firm performance in a study of Chinese corporates. Their 
argument was based on more than 10000 firm-year observations from 2000-2008, but they also 
indicated that female CEOs may be more likely to emerge when there is at least one female 
director on a company board. Further, international cross-listing does not seem to materially 
improve gender- diversity. Overall, though, most findings seem to reflect a positive trend 
between female managerial level representation and firm performance, which may suggest that 
developing female managerial talent could be a competitive advantage for firms. However, 
although the benefits  of women at board or management level is supported by the findings of 
many studies, this may be constrained by how female business leadership is perceived, as well 





Women could face many potential barriers when they pursue senior leadership positions. One 
of the main barriers could be the perception towards women as less suitable and experienced 
than men to fill leadership positions. The prejudice towards female leaders based on role 
congruity could lead to less favorable attitudes towards women in leadership positions and 
further result in barriers to women becoming successful leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002). The 
potential lack of promotion to leadership positions for women could further hamper their 
leadership skills and experience. In addition, cultural and societal norms also lead to males 
usually being perceived as leaders, or acquiring leadership qualities (Alqahtani, 2019).  
Major barriers also exist on the supply side. Work and family balance cost women when they 
pursue high-profile careers or leadership roles. In the study of career advancement of MBA 
students from the University of Chicago, Bertrand, Goldin and Katz (2010)  identified 
motherhood as the major factor that leads female MBA students to discontinue their careers or 
have shorter working hours, which led their earnings to diverge from their male fellows.  
However, this does not mean that women would not be accepted as leaders, particularly on 
corporate boards. Marnburg, Mathisen, and Ogaard (2012) studied 491 directors from 149 
boards of directors in Norway and found that there was little difference in how boardroom 
dynamics were perceived by female and male directors, respectively. Their findings also 
revealed that female chairpersons experienced different dynamics compared to other female 
directors. These results were interpreted that, in Norway at least, female directors are welcomed 
on board and generally not perceived as outsiders. Dunn (2012) further analysed how female 
directors in Canada break barriers into all-male boards. Based on a sample of 193 Canadian 
firms over the period 1996 to2004, it was found that for women to break the barriers into the 
boardroom, they require either firm-specific knowledge or need to become support specialists 
with expertise in specific financial or legal fields. In Italy, Barth, Cebula and Rossi’s (2017) 
study, based on 369 firm-year observations of non-financial public companies in Italy during 
the period 2005 to 2013, indicated that women take on complementary roles with some level 
of tokenism. However, these researchers also found that leverage of corporates increased when 
there is a higher proportion of women on board, implying that at higher levels their 
complementary role in monitoring agency costs weaken. 
Although again mixed, some of these findings may imply an improved level of acceptance in 
some corporate cultures of female leaders, and a degree of acknowledgement of women’s’ 
contributions towards corporate leadership levels. However, it should be noted that these 





effect of different cultures on female top leadership’s impact on business performance, 
including in Asian countries. 
According to Balasubramanian (2011), the importance of addressing gender-diversity in 
corporate leadership is two-fold and leads to both corporate and social benefits. Firstly, 
increasing female representation may benefit firms through improved decision-making 
processes, and thus may achieve better corporate governance and firm performance. 
Secondly, since women form approximately half of the human resource pool, they should be 
entitled to the proportionate right to contribute to corporate governance and performance, as an 
issue of social equity. 
2.3 Cultural Differences and Female Leadership 
The positive association between female leadership and organisational performance is 
supported by evidence from much of the developed world2. However, a question that arises is 
whether this association is affected by the specific cultural backgrounds of different nations. 
Thus, in the literature on the cultural values of Western and Asian countries3, it is possible to 
find some major cultural differences that could lead to different views of females’ positions 
within corporates. 
According to Datesman (n.d.), Americans believe that every individual should have an equal 
chance for success, regardless of their backgrounds, race or gender. However, on the other 
hand, Americans tend to believe that everyone should be responsible for taking care of 
themselves and solving their own problems without reliance on others. Similar values are 
rooted in the UK. Lander (2016) argues that the “Fundamental British Values” include 
democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, mutual respect and tolerance towards different 
beliefs and faiths. Under these value systems, women would be more likely to receive equal 
opportunities and be treated equally in the workplace.  
Further, a belief in equality of success should lead to society evaluating an individual on 
qualification and merit, rather than gender. In such an environment, women may be expected to 
be more independent and willing to express their opinions freely when placed in senior 
positions. Without such an environment, the impact of female leadership within corporates is 
likely to be limited. 
 
2 Examples include studies performed by Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Trinh et.al (2018), Reinert, Weigert 
and Winnefeld (2016), and Dezső and Ross (2008). 
3 For the purpose of this study, America, the U.K. and Germany were selected to represent key Western cultures, 





Adams and Ferreira (2009) analysed American publicly traded firms from 1996 to 2003 and 
found that the presence of female directors on boards significantly affect board input and firm 
outcomes. Thus, female directors had better attendance records than male directors, and further 
resulted in a positive effect on male attendance compared to firms without female board 
members. In addition, it was found that more gender-diverse boards were more likely to focus 
on monitoring corporate performance, and that women tend to join monitoring committees 
more often than males. This may be linked due to a more open US culture that encourages 
women to be outspoken and make a difference. 
However, some studies suggest that, despite female board participation having an impact in the 
US context of liberty and equality, US women are still extremely underrepresented at board 
level. For example, Flynn and Adams (2004), based on a sample of American corporates on 
both the Fortune 500 and Fortune 501-1000 indices, found that women’s representation on 
boards ranged from 10 to 12%. This trend dropped for companies in Fortune 501-1000, with 
Chicago having only 8.4% female board representation and Philadelphia having 9.2%. This 
survey also found that although over 50% of companies that responded had at least two female 
directors, 10% of firms had no women in the boardroom. 
A similar situation was found to exist in the UK. Thus, Brammer, Millington and Pavelin 
(2007) found that there is limited ethnic and gender diversity across UK corporate boards, 
especially at executive levels. However, some cross-sector variation was found in terms of 
gender diversity, with the retail, utilities, media and banking sectors displaying above average 
metrics. These researchers speculated that this could be due to the influence of the external 
environment, in which a closer proximity to final consumers strongly shape board diversity. 
Furthermore, the Cranfield School of Management has conducted research over the past decade 
to analyse the growing trend of female board participation in the U.K. Based on FTSE 100 
companies, Singh et al. (2001) conducted one of the earliest studies in this series, and found 
that firms with at least one female director decreased between 1999 and 2001 (64% of FTSE 
100 firms in 2001), but had increased again by 2005 (78% of FTSE 100 firms). 
 
Further, between 2000 and 2005 the percentage of female executive directors were between 8% 
and 13%, but had increased to 18% by 2010, although only 7.8% of firms had  women directors 
across FTSE 250 companies. The low rates of female involvement in leadership positions in 
the US and UK seems inconsistent with the equal and free cultural values these countries claim 





Germany, a large Western economy, is often seen as having a more conservative value system 
compared to both the UK and the US. Bayer (2018) argued that in addition to the fundamental 
German value system that includes respect for human rights and strong civil society, Germany 
seems to hold rigid bureaucracy at its core, which he sees as a contradiction in a highly 
progressive and developed country. Bayer (2018) further stated that the antiquated family policy 
in Germany makes it difficult for women to balance work and family, thus making it more 
difficult for them reach higher levels of career achievement. However, this does not imply that 
German women necessarily are more reserved and downplay their work life, particularly as the 
established respect for human rights in the German cultural system could be conducive for 
German women making their voices heard in the workplace.  
In order  to further promote gender-equality in German corporates, the German government in 
2016 legislated a requirement that at least 30% of the boards of publicly listed German 
companies has to be female (Anger, 2018). In line with this requirement, Anger (2018) showed 
that in 2017, German listed firms had achieved a female board presence of almost 32.6%- an 
increase of 57.2% from 2013 to 2017. Therefore, although women in Germany may live under 
a more conservative value system than that of the US or the UK, the German respect for human 
rights and awareness of gender equality supported by law may still allow women to have 
influence in the workplace. This may possibly lead to greater female influence at senior levels. 
The above sections focused exclusively on Western societies, but it is also worth exploring 
literature on how Asian cultures respond to female involvement at leadership level, and the 
status of female representation at leadership level in Asian corporates. For example, China, as 
the most influential Asian country, has very traditional and reserved cultural values when 
compared to Western values. Bryant (2019) argued that Chinese culture values hierarchy and 
group interests, as opposed to Western culture, which respects individual rights and is 
comfortable with a flatter societal structure. Whilst Chinese culture requires that individual 
achievement and success should be downplayed, especially in the workplace, in Western 
culture this behaviour is sometimes viewed as weakness. In addition, the Chinese value 
relationships and prefer to avoid confrontations. In this context, Chinese women may feel that 
voicing their different opinions would damage their relationships and reputations, and they 
therefore may appear more reserved and not express their opinions as freely as Western women 
do. 
Empirical evidence in this field is limited, but Liu, Wei and Xie (2014), in their analysis of 





firm performance was stronger in legal person-controlled firms than state-controlled ones. This 
was attributed to hierarchy and control of speech generally being more acceptable in state-
controlled firms. 
Historically, China has had a relatively low rate of female employment at key managerial roles 
or at board level. A study by Lam, McGuinnes and Vieito (2012) of Chinese firms for the period 
2000 to 2008 indicated that only 4,4% of these firms were led by female CEOs. Further, these 
female leaders generally received less compensation than males. However, this study also found 
that over this period the percentage of female CEO-led companies was on the rise, especially in 
privately owned firms. This was thought to be consistent with the theory that competitive forces 
would lessen discriminatory pressures. This trend is possibly driven by an increased self-
awareness of Chinese women and the increased adoption of Western feminist concepts, which 
may transform corporate cultures into a more female- supportive environment, as well as by 
the authorities’ gender-equality policies. 
Japan, as a developed country in Asia, shares a similar but more modest value system than 
China. Evason (2016) argued that in Japanese tradition, group orientation and harmony are the 
most respected values. Thus, Japanese culture emphasises politeness, harmony and modesty in 
interpersonal relations, and it is rare for Japanese to express strong opinions or contradict others 
openly, especially at the workplace. As with Chinese firms, employees value group success and 
orientation more than their personal achievements in Japanese corporates. In addition, Japanese 
society prefers women to be more reserved and focused on family responsibilities. A Japanese 
national survey conducted in 2016 found that 44% of men and 37% of women in Japan still 
agree that women should take primary responsibility for the family, while men should be 
responsible for earning income (Kano, 2018). Although the figure is much lower than in 
the 1970s, when more than 70% of men and women believed in the separation of gender 
roles, this may still reflect societal expectation towards Japanese women in recent times. 
This could be due to the widespread view in Asian countries that the priority of women should 
be family responsibility, rather than career progress. Due to the traditional values and societal 
expectations, women are sometimes treated as of lower worth if they are past young and 
marriageable age in Japanese society, which could further lead to discrimination and 
contradictory standards towards women in the workplace (Lebra, 2007). This has indirectly led 
women to relegate themselves to low-paying jobs in  order to fulfil their nurturing roles. This 
could be a reflection of Japanese views of women’s role in society, in which women are viewed 





lower rate of female representation (and hence a lower level of influence) would be expected 
at senior levels in Japanese corporates. Indeed, a survey performed by Terjesan and Singh 
(2008) confirmed that Japan only had 2% female presence on corporate boards. 
In general, Asian nations, although rapidly developing, display a much lower female 
participation in management positions, especially at leadership levels, when compared to the 
Western countries (Rai, 2012). The above may imply that American, British and German 
women on board and top management may tend to be bolder and more outspoken than their 
Asian equivalents, as their societies encourages gender-equality more. On the other hand, the 
nature of Asian cultures may lead to a lower impact of increased female representation on 
businesses compared to the Western nations examined. As a result, the cultural constraints on 
the ability of women to impact businesses at leadership level can be expected to result in 
differing relationships, and strengths of relationships, between the percentage of women in 
leadership roles and measures of firm performance across these various countries. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
The above theoretical and logical discussion, together with empirical evidence, leads to the 
following hypotheses, which form the basis of this study. 
Hypothesis 1: female board representation and firm performance 
 
H10: Greater female representation at board level is not positively associated with firm 
performance as measured by market and accounting measures 
H1a: Greater female representation at board level is positively associated with firm 
performance as measured by market and accounting measures 
Hypothesis 2: female executive management representation and firm performance 
 
H10: Greater female representation at executive management level is not positively 
associated with firm performance as measured by market and accounting measures 
H1a: Greater female representation at executive management level is positively associated 
with firm performance as measured by market and accounting measures 
Hypothesis 3: female leadership representation and country-effects 
 
H10: The strength of the relationship between female representation at both board and 
executive management level and firm performance as measured by market and 





H1a: The strength of the relationship between female representation at both board and 
executive management level and firm performance as measured by market and 
accounting measures, does differ across various countries/cultures 
 
The contribution of the study is therefore to address specific gaps in the literature identified from the 
above analysis. Specifically, prior literature focused mainly on the impact of female board representation 
on firm performance in developed countries, and to a very limited extent on the gender impact at top 
management level. In the light of this, this study seeks to add value by indirectly investigating the 
potential cultural the impact of female board and top management representation through comparison 
across selected Western and Asian countries. In particular, this study includes China, where little prior 
literature is available, specifically on the link between Chinese female participation in top management 
and firm performance. This cross-country comparison, including China, that touches on the cultural 







Chapter 3: Research Design 
This chapter discusses the research design, consisting of the sampling, data collection and 
statistical methodology used in this study to test whether there is a relationship between female 
board and senior management representation and company performance across countries. 
3.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
The sample data used comprised of all listed firms that make up the major stock indices in 
China (the CSI 300), the US (the S&P 500), the UK (the FTSE 100), Germany (the DAX 30), 
and Japan (the Nikkei 225). The selected indices consist of the largest capitalisation stocks on 
the relevant exchanges, and therefore represent a significant part of the respective countries’ 
economies. 
The data used in this study included firm financial performance and market sentiment measures 
(ROA and Tobin’s Q) and female representation measures (the percentage women on firm 
boards of directors, and the percentage of female executives). In addition, total assets, board 
size, the debt to equity ratio and total assets turnover for each firm were collected as control 
variables. These variables are indicators of firm size, board size, leverage and asset turnover, 
respectively. The above data was sourced from the Bloomberg terminal, an international data 
base providing standardised data, and hence improves the reliability and replicability of the 
study.  
Prior to 2013 board gender composition data was not available for most Chinese companies, 
and as a result data across the regions was collected from 2013 onward until 2019. However, 
in this study the dependent variables were lagged with regards to the independent variables, 
and for the part of the study related to female board representation the analysis period covered 
was therefore from 2014 to 2019.  
Therefore, although the original data collected ran from 2013 to 2019, the actual test period ran 
from 2014 to 2019 as a result of the one-year lag built into the methodology. However, the 
analysis of female impact on firm performance from a managerial perspective was conducted 
for 2019 only, as data on female executive representation for the majority of the countries 
considered was not available prior to that year. 
Firm years were removed from the original sample if any data point for one or more of the 
variables was missing for that year. The majority of data missing for China related to the 
variables measuring board size and the percentage of corporate boards that are female. The 





missing data loss also related to the board size and female board percentage variables, as well 
as to the level of leverage in the early years of the period. For the remaining three countries 
(Japan, the UK and Germany), in addition to female board percentage, the main source of 
missing data was the level of leverage. This applied throughout the entire test period. 
For the board-focussed study, the one-year lag approach led to all the firm years for 2013 being 
excluded, as well as companies that were only listed for one year of the sample period. For the 
executive-focussed study, the control variable that accounts for the size of the board was not 
considered, as the large number of missing observations under this variable across the firms 
would have reduced the already small sample to a size that would have been unsuitable for 
analysis. This is therefore a limitation of the investigation of the female executive impact due 
to data constraint. 
Table 3-1 below indicates the reduction in the number of observations from the original data 
points to the final sample due to missing data and/or the lagging effect for the board-level study. 
Table 3-2 shows the same for the managerial (executives) representation analysis. Note that the 
number of observations in the original sample for the female board representation analysis was 
for the 2013 to 2019 period, and that of female executive representation analysis was for 2019 
only, hence the large difference between the number of observations in the original and final 
samples. 
Table 3-1: Sample Process (Female Board Representation Analysis) 
 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
Number of observations in original 
sample 
2099 1575 3526 708 210 
Sample reduced by: 
Data shortage or missing data (161) (67) (1829) (65) (3) 
Firms with only one-year 
observation 
(86) (7) (67) (16) (0) 
One-year lagging effect (389) (232) (476) (118) (34) 
Number of observations in final 
Sample 





Table 3-2: Sample Process (Female Executives Representation Analysis) 
 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
Number of observations in original 
sample 
300 225 505 101 29 
Sample reduced by: 
Data shortage or missing data (1) (8) (25) (6) (1) 
Number of observations in final 
Sample 
299 217 480 95 28 
 
 
3.2 Regression Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable – Firm Performance 
Firm performance was the dependent variable in this study. In line with the studies of Adams 
and Ferreira (2007) and Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015), this was measured as either a 
market valuation indicator (Tobin’s Q), or an accounting-based measure (the return-on-assets 
ratio or ROA). 
Tobin’s Q was defined as the value of total assets less the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. If Tobin’s Q is greater than 1, it implies 
that the market believes that the firm will increase shareholder value in future. However, if it is 
less than 1, the market expects the firm to underperform in future (Terjesen, Couto and 
Francisco, 2015). The natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q was taken to address the non-normality 
of the residuals, consistent with the research conducted by Terjesen, Couto and Francisco 
(2015). 
ROA serves as a commonly used financial measure to evaluate firm performance from an 
accounting perspective. In line with the research done by Adams and Ferreira (2007), ROA is 
defined as net income divided by the average of total assets. 
3.2.2 Variables of Interest – % of the Board or % of Senior Executives that are Female  
The variables of interest used in this study were the percentage of firm boards that were female, 
and the percentage of firm top executives that were women. In this case, female 
executive implies any female who functions at top-management level with the responsibility to 
manage critical corporate affairs and have the authority to make decisions within specified 





(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and executive vice presidents. The above caters for both 
research dimensions, namely the strategic and operational impact of females on corporate 
performance through, respectively, board or top management representation. 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
In order to perform the analysis, a number of variables known to be associated with firm 
performance were controlled for. This study therefore controlled for firm size, size of the board, 
level of leverage, and assets turnover, with these variables being lagged by one year. 
3.2.3.1 Firm size 
Firm Size was measured by the book value of total assets. The positive relationship between 
firms’ total assets and Tobin’s Q was well documented in the research done by Carter et al. 
(2010). In addition, Lee (2009) provided evidence that the profitability of firms is positively 
correlated with the size of the firm. The main reasoning behind the positive relationship was 
outlined by Sila, Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2016), who argued that larger firms are less risky,  
which could affect firm performance and valuation. This could imply that firm size should be 
controlled for, as it may affect firm performance significantly. The natural logarithm of firm’s 
total assets was thus used, and the logged values were used as a proxy for firm size, in line with 
the past research4. 
3.2.3.2 Board Size 
Board size measures the size of the corporate board, i.e. the number of directors on board. A 
study performed by Jackling and Johl (2009) found board size was to be significantly related 
to firm performance. This was driven by the argument that a larger board improves firm 
performance because it increases the information available to the board when making decisions. 
However, Guest (2009) argued otherwise when he found that board size of is strongly 
negatively correlated with firms’ profitability level and Tobin’s Q, as well as their share returns. 
Garg (2007) similarly provided evidence of an inverse relation between board size and firm 
performances. The main argument was that a larger board may experience more problems of 
poor communication and decision-making, which would undermine its effectiveness (Guest, 
2009). 
3.2.3.3 Level of Leverage 
The level of leverage, defined as the ratio of total debts to total equity, is another variable that 
is strongly related to firm performance, as suggested by the research of Campbell and 
 





Vera (2008). However, Raza (2013) found contrasting evidence that supports a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm performance, especially profitability. He argued that 
long-term debt would be more expensive due to direct and indirect costs, which leads to lower 
profitability when the level of debts is high. Interestingly, Ibhagui and Olokoyo (2018) 
discovered that although leverage was negatively related to firm performance, this relationship 
was stronger for smaller-sized firms. As the firm size grew, the negative effect would diminish 
gradually. Thus, in order to control the effect of leverage on financial risk, the level of leverage 
was used as a control variable in this study. 
3.2.3.4 Firm Efficiency 
Firm Efficiency was measured through the ratio of turnover to assets. A study by Muritala 
(2012) found evidence that assets turnover has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
In particular, he suggested that firms that utilise more tangible assets would be less likely to 
experience financial problems. This significant positive impact of assets turnover on firm 
financial performance measures, including ROA, was confirmed by the research of 
Pouraghajan and Malekian (2012). Based on this evidence and arguments, this study controls 
for firm efficiency in the form of asset turnover on the basis that firms should perform better 
with more efficient use of their assets. For this purpose, the total assets turnover ratio (revenue 
divided by total assets) was used. 
3.2.4. One-Year Lag 
The impact of female presence on boards is unlikely to have an immediate effect on firm 
performance, and therefore it is advisable to lag the firm performance measure to the female 
board participation variable. Thus, Carter et al. (2010) found little difference in the results of a  
one-year lag and a two-year lag, and therefore used a one-year lag to estimate this effect. 
Similarly, in this study, a one-year lagged effect was implemented for the board component. 
This means that the dependent variable used in year t was combined with the independent 
variables in year t-1 in the regression models. For example, the firm performance measured in 
2019 corresponded to the control variables (including the percentage of women on the board) 
for 2018. However, due to data constraints, the relationship between female executive 
management and for performance was only possible for 2019, and hence not lagged. 
To some extent this difference in approach can be justified in terms of the different functionality 
of the board and management within firms. A corporate board’s role is to make strategic 





hence a one-year lag makes more sense that a concurrent performance measure. On the other 
hand, management, including executives, are more responsible for operational and short-term 
decisions and implementation. These decisions are likely to reflect sooner in firms’ 
performance, reducing the requirement for a lagged approach. 
The table below summarises the variables used in the regressions that follow. 
Table 3-3: Regression Variables 
Variable Definition 
Variable Name 
used in Regression 
ROA Return on Assets ratio ROA 
Tobin’s Q Natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio TobinsQ 
Female board representation Percentage of corporate board as women FemaleBoard 
Female executive 
management representation Percentage of female as Executives FemaleExecutives 
Firm size Natural logarithm of Total assets FirmSize 
Board size Number of Board of Directors/ size of board BoardSize 
Leverage Debt to equity ratio Leverage 
Asset turnover Total assets turnover ratio/ total revenue to total assets ratio AssetsTurnover 
 
3.3 Panel Data Statics Methods 
To answer the question of whether there is an association between female board and executive 
management representation and firm performance, this study makes use of both unbalanced 
panel data and non-panel data for female board and managerial impact, respectively. 
Depending on the nature of the panel dataset, there are three panel data regression options, 
namely a pooled OLS regression model, a Fixed Effects (FE) regression model or a Random 
Effects (RE) regression model. While the analysis for female executive impact utilises the 
multivariate regression method which will be discussed in the following sections, this section 
will focus on highlighting the difference between the three potential panel regression methods. 
3.3.1 Panel Data 
Panel data involves data sets that have both cross-sectional and time-series components 
(Wooldridge, 2013:448). This means that observations are made on the same unit across a time 
period. This approach has the advantage of achieving a more accurate estimation of the 





of freedom and greater sample variability (Hsiao, 2007). In addition, panel analysis accounts 
for the individual-specific effect. Further, Arellano (2003) suggested that the limitation of many 
non-panel regression models is that they do not consider specific omitted variables. 
Specifically, these omitted variables may impact the independent variable due to the correlation 
between the omitted variable and the explanatory variables. Panel regression methods attempt 
to address this problem. 
3.3.2 The Pooled OLS Regression Model 
Pooled regression implies the pooling of all the observations for each unit across the time period 
in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, and this regression method is therefore 
similar to the multivariate linear regression model. When no individual effect is present (i.e. no 
cross-sectional or time-series effect), pooled regression estimates should be efficient (Greene, 
2008: 183; Park, 2011: 7). However, if the regression process involves individual effects, 
pooled regression may not be the most accurate method to use, due to possible violation of 
underlying OLS regression assumptions (Park, 2011: 7). Instead, either the Fixed Effects (FE) 
or the Random Effects (RE) model should be used to address the presence of individual effects. 
The major difference between the FE and RE models is the inferences they draw from the data 
sample. In the case of the FE model, a researcher can draw inference about the group of firms 
considered in the data sample, whereas a RE model enables the researcher to support inferences 
about the overall population the sample was drawn from. In addition, an FE model supports 
correlation between the individual effect (in this case, firm-specific effect) of the omitted 
variables and the independent variables, while RE model assumes otherwise (Greene, 2008: 
183). 
3.3.2.1 Fixed Effects Model 
Under the fixed effects model, the slope and error variances of the individual effect are assumed 
to be constant and considered in the intercept term (Park, 2011: 8). In addition, it is assumed 
that the individual effects do not change over time and are correlated with the independent 
variables (Greene, 2008: 193; Park, 2011: 8). With the fixed effects model, one could draw 






3.3.2.2 Random Effects Model 
Under the random effects model, the slope and intercept terms are constant, but the error term 
is randomly distributed (Park, 2011: 8). This is because the individual effect of the omitted 
variables is assumed to be uncorrelated to the independent variables, which differs from the 
assumption under the fixed effects model (Greene, 2008: 183). This causes the individual 
differences to be captured in the error term, instead of in the intercept term. With the random 
effects model, one could draw inferences for the overall population based on the data sample 
drawn. 
3.4 Model Diagnostic and Selection Testing 
In order to efficiently perform regression analyses, it is important to check against the relevant 
regression assumptions, i.e. the diagnostics of the sample. The relevant diagnostic and model 
selection tests used to select the most appropriate panel regression models for this study are 
discussed in this section. 
3.4.1 Model Selection Tests 
In order to perform panel regression analyses a selection has to be made from three potential 
models, namely that Pooled OLS regression model, the Fixed Effects model (FE model), and 
the Random Effects model (RE model). This selection is done on the basis of various statistical 
diagnostic tests. 
3.4.1.1 Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
The Lagrange Multiplier test was used to compare the Random Effects models to the Pooled 
OLS models. The null hypothesis is that the variances of the individual-effect error are zero 
(Park, 2011: 39). Based on the test results shown in Table A-1 in Appendix A, all the models 
indicated a rejection of the null hypothesis at a one percent significance level. This means that 
the Random Effects model is a more appropriate model to use than the OLS model. 
3.4.1.2 F-Test 
In order to compare the Fixed Effects model to the OLS model, an F-test was used. In this case, 
the null hypothesis is that the binary variable parameters are zero, i.e. that there are no fixed 
effects (Park, 2011:33). The test results, presented in Table A-2 of Appendix A, indicated the 
rejection of the null hypothesis at a one percent significance level. This implies that the Fixed 





3.4.1.3 Hausman Test 
In order to determine which one of the Fixed Effects and Random Effects models is more 
appropriate to the dataset, a Hausman specific test was performed. This test has a null 
hypothesis that the regression errors of independent variables are not correlated with those of 
the individual-specific effects, i.e., that the Random Effects model is more suitable than the 
Fixed Effects model (Torres-Reyna, 2007: 29). A statistically significant rejection of the 
hypothesis would indicate the Fixed Effects model to be more appropriate in this case. 
The test results are displayed in Table A-3of Appendix A. In all case the tests failed to reject 
the null hypothesis at any reasonable level of significance. Therefore, the Random Effects 
model was the preferred model for regression of the data sample across all the sample countries. 
3.4.2 Model Diagnostics 
Model diagnostic tests are required to confirm that the data meets the relevant model 
assumptions, as violations of these assumptions could lead to either Type I or Type II errors, 
which may reduce the credibility of the regression results (Osborne & Waters, 2002). 
3.4.2.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables are correlated. This could cause the true 
impact of independent variables on the dependent variables not to be appropriately reflected by 
the results of the regression models (Wooldridge, 2009). This requirement was confirmed by 
checking the correlation coefficients between the independent variables for the data sample 
separately for each country. The Pearson Correlation Matrices for the independent variables in 
each country are presented in Chapter 4. Based on the matrices, all correlation coefficients were 
below eighty five percent, which implies that the risk of negative impact due to 
multicollinearity on the regression analysis is low. (Schroeder, 1990: 175) 
3.4.2.2 Autocorrelation 
The Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test was used to investigate the effect of serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) in the panel models for the female board representation analysis (Breusch, 
1978; Godfrey, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002). The null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation. Based on Table B-1 in Appendix B, all panel models (i.e. Random Effects models) 
against both independent measures (ROA and Tobin’s Q) for each country was found to reject 
the null hypothesis at a one percent significance level. For female managerial/executive 





was used, the Durbin-Watson test was used to test for serial correlation (autocorrelation). The 
null hypothesis is that the autocorrelation of the disturbances is zero. Table B-2 presents the 
test results. The majority of the models were found to reject the null hypothesis at one, five or 
ten percent significance levels. The US was an exception that failed to reject the null hypothesis. 
The results imply that autocorrelation may have some impact on the modelling results for both 
female board and executive representation impact analysis. In order to address this issue, the 
sandwich estimators of variance (also known as the robust estimator of variance) were used 
when the regression analyses were performed (Hoechle, 2007: 284; Torres-Reyna, 2007: 35). 
It should be noted that the impact of autocorrelation would only be on the statistical inferences, 
but that the estimations remain unbiased (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002). 
3.4.2.3 Heteroscedasticity 
The Breusch-Pagan test was used to test for possible heteroscedasticity in both the panel models 
and the multiple regression models. The null hypothesis is homoscedasticity, which implies 
constant variance of the error terms (Torres-Reyna, 2007: 35). The test results are shown in 
Table B-3 and Table B-4 (Appendix B). The majority of the models were found to reject the 
null hypothesis and suggest heteroscedasticity in the models. However, Germany was an 
exception under both the panel models and multiple regression models analysis. The underlying 
heteroscedasticity may have some impacts on the statistical inferences. Similar to 
autocorrelation, this issue was addressed with the use of sandwich estimators of variance 
(Hoechle, 2007: 284; Torres-Reyna, 2007: 35). 
3.4.2.4 Normality of residuals 
One of the major regression assumptions is the normality of the residuals in the models 
(Gujarati, 1995: 238). This can be tested through various statistical tests, the best known of 
which is the Shapiro-Wilk test. The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to investigate the normality of 
the residuals in the regression models. The null hypothesis is that the residuals are normally 
distributed. The majority of both the panel models and multiple regression models were found 
to reject the null hypothesis, although the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q and firm size variables 
were taken. This implies that their residuals are not normally distributed (see Table B-5 and 
Table B-6 in Appendix B). 
Although the significance test provides evidence that the residuals may not be normally 





could be easy to obtain significant results with large sample size when using significance test 
to check data normality. 
In addition, it should be noted that, although the non-normality of the error residuals may affect 
the estimation and inference of the regression models, the models’ unbiasedness (or being 
selected as the best linear estimator) is not affected (Wooldridge, 2013: 175; Gujarati, 1995; 
238). This means that the t and F distribution for the t and F statistics may not necessarily be 
the exact t and F distributions (Wooldridge, 2013: 168). However, according to the Central 
Limit Theorem, the t and F statistics would have approximately t and F distributions if the size 
of the data sample is large (Wooldridge, 2013: 168). This (i.e. a large data sample) is certainly 
the case in this research, especially for the female board representation analysis. 
When interpreting the results based on data in the form of natural logs, it is important to note 
that one-unit change in the independent variable implies one percentage change in the 
dependent variable, instead of one absolute unit change (Niap, 2013: 138). 
3.5 Regression Procedure and Regression Models 
In order to analyse the relationship between female board and managerial representation and 
firm performance from both the financial and market sentiment perspectives, comprehensive 
regression procedures were required, as described below. 
3.5.1 Regression Procedure for the Female Board Representation Effect 
In order to study the relationship between female board representation effect and firm 
performance, this study used unbalanced panel data and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression techniques. As this analysis considered both time and firm specific factors, panel 
data methods were used. This is consistent with the paper of Adams and Ferreira (2007) that 
studied the link between corporate board gender diversity and firm performance for US publicly 
traded firms from 1996 to 2003. 
The two main firm performance measures (dependent variables) were ROA and Tobin’s Q, 
which were used to measure financial performance and market sentiment towards corporates, 
respectively (Terjesen, Couto & Francisco, 2015; Trinh et.al, 2018). The main independent 
variable was the percentage of women on corporate board for that specific firm. The control 





Initially asset turnover was considered as a possible candidate control variable, but it was not 
selected for use due to two reasons. Firstly, in panel data analysis, the number of years in the 
test period must be larger than the number of independent variables, including the intercept of 
regression. In this study, due to the one-year lag used in the regression, the total number of 
years examined was six years, and the total number of independent variables, including all 
initial control variables, plus the intercept, was also six. Thus, one of the control variables had 
to be removed. Secondly, asset turnover is not nearly as commonly supported in the literature 
as the other three control variables5. Thus, asset turnover was discarded as a control variable. 
In order to select which one of three potential regressions should be applicable for 
interpretation, various statistical tests were performed. Firstly, the Lagrange Multiplier test was 
performed to indicate whether the Random Effects model is the preferred model than the pooled 
OLS model. Then, an F-test was performed against the pooled OLS regression and the Fixed 
Effect model to confirm the more appropriate model to the dataset. Lastly, a Hausman specific 
test was performed to choose between the Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model. 
The process of model selection through statistical testing and panel regression modelling was 
performed for each country’s final sample data. The process was performed twice for each 
country because of the two different dependent variable measures (i.e. ROA and Tobin’s Q).  
For each country, there are three possible modelling options, i.e. the Pooled OLS regression 
model, the FE model, and the RE model. However, only the most statistically most appropriate 
model was chosen in each case from among the three potential models, based on the results of 
the three statistical tests as described above. This implied that for each country there were 
potentially six regression models (two independent variables, and three panel data regression 
options), but only the two statistically appropriate models were selected in each case. As five 
different countries were examined (China, Japan, the US, the UK and Germany), this implied 
a total of thirty potential models, from which ten statistically suitable models were selected for 
this study. 
The regression models used for each country’s final sample data were as shown below. 
 
ROAit = α+β1FemaleBoardit-1+β2FirmSizeit-1+β3BoardSizeit-1+β4Leverageit-1+ (εit-1+ui) (Eq. 1) 
 









Note that the ith firm performance at year t is measured either through ROA or Tobin’s Q. α is 
the intercept. FemaleBoard represents the percentage of corporate board as women. FirmSize 
and BoardSize measure the size of firm and size of corporate board, respectively. Leverage is 
the variable that measures the level of leverage of firms. εit-1 is the error term which is 
independent identically distributed. 
It is important to note that, if ui is defined as the fixed or random effect that is specific to firm 
or time period, then for pooled OLS regression, α and εit-1 are constant with ui equals zero. As 
for Fixed Effects model, α equals the sum of α and ui with constant εit-1. In addition, for the 
Random Effects model, α is constant and εit-1 equals the sum of εit-1 and ui. 
After running the three potential regression approaches for each independent measure, the three 
statistical tests required to identify the appropriate regression model were performed in the 
sequence LM test, F-test and Hausman test. The outcome of the model selection tests 
determined the final panel data regression approach chosen to run the regression testing for 
correlation between female board representation and firm performance. 
3.5.2 Regression Procedure for the Female Management Representation Effect 
In order to study the relationship between the female representation in firm executive 
management and firm performance, the study performed a multivariate regression analysis on 
the variables considered. The required sample data (specifically the percentage of women in 
firms’ executive management) was only available for 2019. A multivariate linear regression 
was applied for the investigation of observations without time-series component, i.e. the 
observations are over one-year period (Darmadi, 2020). The variables used were largely as 
before, namely ROA and Tobin’s Q as independent variables, and firm size, leverage and asset 
turnover as control variables. In this case, however, the independent variable of interest was 
the percentage of women acting as top executives in a firm. However, as the nature of the data 
did not require a panel regression approach, assets turnover could in this case be included as a 
control variable, and the approach used was a multivariate pooled regression. 
It was further not possible to lag the female executive representation and the control variables 
in the regression models to the dependent firm performance measures, given that data on the 
female executive representation was only available for 2019. Thus, whilst for the board effect 
regressions the dependent variable was lagged by a year to the independent variables, in the 
executive management effect regressions all variables were measured concurrently. However, 
it is argued that this is not entirely unreasonable, as the decisions and actions of top exe:cutive 





decisions made by board. In the latter case, decisions and actions can be expected to take longer 
to translate into performance, and hence a lagging approach seems warranted. 
The regression models used in this part of the analysis for each country’s final sample were: 
ROAit = α + β1FemaleExecsit-1+ β2FirmSizeit-1+ β3Leverageit-1+ β4AssetsTurnoverit-1+εit-1 
          (Eq. 3) 
 
   Tobin’s Qit = α + β1FemaleExecsit-1+ β2FirmSizeit-1+ β3Leverageit-1+ β4AssetsTurnoverit-1+εit-1 
          (Eq. 4) 
intercept. FemaleExec(utive)s is the variable that measures the percentage of top firm 
executives that are female. FirmSize and BoardSize represent the size of firm and size of 
corporate board, respectively. Leverage measures the level of leverage of firms. εit-1 is the error 
term which is independent identically distributed. 
Unlike panel data analysis, there was no requirement for further statistical tests to select the 
most statistically accurate model to analyse results, and results were solely based on the results 
obtained from the multivariate pooled regression model formed for each country. 
3.5.3 Analysis approach to Investigate Potential Cultural Effects on the Results 
Apart from analysing the various regression results to investigate the relationship between 
female presence on company boards and at firm executive management level, the results also 
make possible an indirect assessment of differences across countries. In general, a higher 
estimated coefficient on the female board or management variables would imply a stronger 
correlation between the relevant female representation measure and corporate performance. 
Thus, by comparing these coefficients across the countries covered by this study, some 
speculative conclusions can be drawn regarding, amongst other things, possible cultural or 
country specific factors affecting these results. Overall, such an analysis would be worth 
performing, as it could indicate potential cultural factor influencing the impact of female 
participation on corporate performance. For example, Srinivas, Allen and Sakamoto (1999) 
found a favourable attitude towards women in management in the U.S., whereas Japanese male 
managers indicated that they would be reluctant to work under senior female leaders. 





Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
This chapter discusses and analyses the results obtained using the methodology described in the 
previous chapter, starting with a discussion of the descriptive statistics of the various samples 
and associated data used. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics refers to the summarisation of a set of data in terms of its statistical 
characteristics. Because this study consisted of two separate components and hence two 
different samples, the descriptive statistics related to female board representation is discussed 
first, followed by the descriptive statistics related to female executive representation. 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistic for Female Board Representation 
As discussed above, an overview of female board representation across each country is useful 
in understanding the context of this part of the study. 
The table on the next page shows the descriptive statistics of variables involved in the analysis 
of the correlation between female board representation for the countries examined for the period 
2013 to 2019. The variables ROA, FemaleBoard, TobinsQ, Ln (TobinsQ), FirmSize, Ln 
(FirmSize) and BoardSize are as defined in the previous chapter. However, one needs to notice 
that in the sections other than descriptive statistics, TobinsQ was defined as the natural 
logarithm of the Tobin’s Q. Under descriptive statistics, TobinsQ and Ln (TobinsQ) refer to the 
original value and the original value converted to its natural logarithm, respectively. 
Note that AssetsTurnover is included in the descriptive statistics for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the sample characteristics, even though this variable was not used in the 
regression modelling process. 
 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Female Board Representation Analysis 
 






N 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 
Mean 5.421% 2.183 0.550 10.697% 6.527E+11 24.889 10 1.042 54.652% 
Median 3.270% 1.412 0.345 9.091% 4.855E+10 24.606 9 0.626 44.949% 
SD 6.049% 2.179 0.595 11.396% 2.681E+12 1.832 3 1.213 47.617% 
Min -19.036% 0.725 -0.322 0.000% 1.295E+09 20.982 1 0.000 2.003% 
Max 46.278% 27.743 3.323 66.667% 2.820E+13 30.970 22 8.223 305.672% 
 






N 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 1269 
Mean 3.410% 1.272 0.181 4.059% 7.379E+12 28.214 11 0.976 76.052% 
Median 3.169% 1.096 0.092 0.000% 1.534E+12 28.059 10 0.588 78.954% 
SD 3.552% 0.542 0.313 5.948% 2.752E+13 1.408 3 1.472 38.653% 
Min -25.347% 0.624 -0.472 0.000% 1.207E+11 25.517 3 0.000 1.158% 
Max 26.311% 5.298 1.667 42.857% 3.064E+14 33.356 26 15.497 255.892% 
 






N 1153 1153 1153 1153 1153 1153 1153 1153 1153 
Mean 6.162% 2.188 0.634 21.130% 8.032E+10 23.904 11 1.402 66.129% 
Median 5.151% 1.719 0.542 20.000% 2.070E+10 23.753 11 0.794 50.699% 
SD 7.128% 1.430 0.513 9.209% 2.523E+11 1.325 2 3.134 62.004% 
Min -51.547% 0.643 -0.442 0.000% 8.872E+08 20.604 0 0.000 3.423% 













N 509 509 509 509 509 509 509 509 509 
Mean 6.403% 1.901 0.452 23.687% 1.224E+11 23.651 11 1.058 70.091% 
Median 5.061% 1.406 0.341 25.000% 1.207E+10 23.214 11 0.629 56.718% 
SD 10.828% 2.615 0.509 9.657% 3.517E+11 1.763 3 1.167 57.968% 
Min -20.832% 0.688 -0.375 0.000% 7.417E+07 18.122 5 0.000 0.252% 
Max 193.454% 52.908 3.969 72.727% 2.729E+12 28.635 28 7.991 343.616% 
 






N 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
Mean 4.045% 1.503 0.335 24.544% 1.765E+11 24.894 16 1.194 63.640% 
Median 4.053% 1.249 0.222 25.000% 4.565E+10 24.544 18 0.721 60.297% 
SD 3.488% 0.642 0.363 10.860% 3.307E+11 1.363 4 1.615 38.124% 
Min -7.746% 0.885 -0.123 0.000% 5.112E+09 22.355 4 0.019 0.742% 





















An interesting observation from the above descriptive statistics is the average level of female 
board representation observed across the samples for the countries examined. On an average 
level, Japan has the lowest female board representation rate. The Western nations (the US, the 
UK and Germany) have achieved a comparable level of female board representation on average. 
However, the level of female representation on corporate boards in the Western nations is nearly 
double that of Chinese firms and five times that of Japanese corporates. 
Although the female board presence in China is lower than that of the US and the UK, it is 
almost double the rate of Japan. Thus, in general, it appears that female board representation is 
higher on average in the Western countries in this study (i.e., the US, the UK and Germany) 
when compared to those of the Asian countries (i.e., China and Japan). The most likely reason 
for this observation is the underlying cultural differences between Eastern and Western societies 
in terms of the attitude towards women in corporates.  
As previously indicated, whilst Western nations focus on gender equality as a fundamental 
value, Asian countries prefer hierarchy and female modesty in organisations (Datesman, n.d.; 
Lander, 2016; Bayer, 2018; Bryant, 2019; Evason, 2016). These cultural differences likely 
affect the ability of women to reach, and play a role at, firms’ higher management levels. Thus, 
for example, according to Dalton’s (2013) study, the traditional gender role expectations are 
still deeply rooted in Japanese society, including that women should be primarily responsible 
for homes and contribute to motherhood, although they may have potential for career 
advancements and serve positions in corporates, or even the government. 
Based on the respective country averages, the sizes of corporate boards seem similar across 
various regions (generally around 11 people), except for Germany, which has slightly larger 
boards (i.e. 16 board directors on average) than the other countries examined. From the leverage 
perspective, on average, US corporates display the highest level of leverage amongst the 
countries examined (1.402 times), and Japanese ones the lowest (0.976 times). In general, the 
leverage level of Western firms (i.e. the US, the UK and Germany) is higher than that of the 
Asian corporates (i.e. China and Japan). A partial explanation may again be in terms of potential 
cultural differences, as Asian cultures are more risk-averse than the Western ones. 
In terms of efficiency as indicated by asset turnover, Japanese firms were the most efficient in 
the sample, and Chinese firms the least benefit from their assets. An interesting analysis is that 
of female board presence across the five countries investigated over the test period. The graph 
below depicts the yearly female board representation rate for each country from 2013 to 2019. 
 
 
  Table 4-2: Average Female Board Representation Yearly Trend  
The graph above shows an overall flat trend over time across the countries examined. Over the 
seven years of the test period (i.e., 2013-2019), the presence of women on company boards in 
all five countries seems to have stagnated, with only Germany perhaps displaying a slight 
increase in its female board representation level between 2018 and 2019. 
It is further interesting to analyse the distribution of female board presence amongst corporates 
in each country sample over the period. The table below depicts the proportion of firms with 
specific female board representation across the countries examined for the period 2013 to 2019. 
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An interesting observation from the above table is that, on average, 47.3% of German corporates 
in the sample have achieved greater than 25% female board representation over the entire 
period, which is the highest amongst the countries examined. It is also noticeable that there is an 
upward trend in female board representation, which could be linked to the introduction of 
gender quota legislation, as mentioned earlier. 
In the US and the UK, over the sample period, the average percentage of companies with boards 
consisting of more than 25% women was, 25.3% and 32.2%, respectively. In both countries, 
for the sample at least, the trend is again slowly upward. When it comes to the two Asian 
countries, however, the picture is very different. On average, only 9.4% of Chinese firms have 
more 25% of board their boards consisting of women, although the trend is slightly upward. At 
the low extreme is the Japan sample, with only 0.7% of company years showing a female board 
presence of more than, Thus, over the period, more than 58% of company years indicated no 
female board presence at all. 
In general, the overall trend of female’s board representation reflects a steady but flat outlook 
over the period across all five countries examined. 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Female Executive Representation 
The sample used to study the link between female representation in senior managerial positions 
consisted of the same countries as the first (board) part of the study, but due to constraints 
imposed by a lack of data availability covered only one year (2019), instead of seven years. 
Therefore, the sample and the associated variables differ from that described above. This is 
specifically applicable to Germany, as the number of observations of German companies was 
only 28 in 2019 due to lack of data. This could impose a limitation towards finding in German 
corporates. 
The table on the next page displays the descriptive statistics of variables involved in the female 
executive presence analysis for each country examined. FemaleExecutives denotes the 
percentage of women at top executives’ level, and the remainder of the variables are defined 














Table 4-4: Descriptive Statistic of Variables for Female Executive Representation Analysis 
 





N 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Mean 5.752% 2.205 0.527 13.834% 7.636E+11 25.240 1.036 55.048% 
Median 3.256% 1.285 0.251 12.500% 6.769E+10 24.938 0.654 48.002% 
SD 6.140% 2.177 0.643 14.355% 3.165E+12 1.756 1.121 47.095% 
Min -4.200% 0.725 -0.322 0.000% 4.686E+09 22.268 0.000 2.470% 
Max 34.847% 15.544 2.744 66.667% 3.043E+13 31.046 5.387 326.365% 
          





N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Mean 3.566% 1.317 0.178 1.835% 9.486E+12 28.356 0.906 73.049% 
Median 3.072% 1.058 0.057 0.000% 1.780E+12 28.208 0.505 77.902% 
SD 3.195% 0.852 0.379 4.375% 3.534E+13 1.457 1.438 37.337% 
Min -7.217% 0.624 -0.472 0.000% 7.310E+10 25.015 0.000 1.033% 
Max 17.457% 9.323 2.232 40.000% 3.130E+14 33.377 14.569 201.716% 
          





N 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Mean 6.619% 2.183 0.632 18.824% 9.484E+10 24.159 3.076 63.043% 
Median 5.351% 1.682 0.520 18.182% 2.670E+10 24.008 0.998 49.083% 
SD 6.266% 1.476 0.511 13.018% 2.798E+11 1.325 15.588 56.400% 
Min -15.514% 0.851 -0.162 0.000% 1.750E+09 21.283 0.018 3.634% 
















N 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Mean 8.423% 2.456 0.503 16.292% 1.132E+11 23.594 1.132 65.735% 
Median 5.093% 1.380 0.322 13.333% 1.230E+10 23.233 0.755 52.345% 
SD 20.968% 5.480 0.645 13.309% 3.418E+11 1.802 1.496 52.707% 
Min -13.733% 0.747 -0.291 0.000% 1.000E+08 18.421 0.000 0.238% 
Max 193.454% 52.908 3.969 50.000% 2.730E+12 28.635 12.444 280.085% 
          





N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Mean 4.089% 1.507 0.325 12.795% 1.851E+11 25.022 0.974 53.097% 
Median 3.202% 1.222 0.200 14.286% 5.674E+10 24.760 0.767 51.643% 
SD 3.270% 0.729 0.393 8.627% 3.292E+11 1.335 0.780 32.848% 
Min -0.967% 0.929 -0.074 0.000% 7.002E+09 22.669 0.053 1.836% 





















Below is another graphic representation that depicts the average female executive 
representation in 2019 for each country examined. 
 
 
Based on the average level of female executive representation for the sample in 2019, the US 
component has the highest female top executive representation rate of 18.8%, followed by the 
UK at 16.3%. At 13.8%, China has a slightly higher level of female executive representation 
than that of Germany (12.3%). Consistent with the corporate board picture, Japan again ranks 
significantly lower than any of the other countries, with a figure of 1.8%. This could be due 
to the unfavourable attitude towards women in senior leadership positions within Japanese 
organisation, as led by the Japanese cultural values. A 2016 national survey in Japan still 
showed that more than 40% of men and more than 35% of women believe in the gendered 
division of labour (Kano, 2018). Lebra (2007) also suggested that there exists an “M” 
shaped curve to represent the general trend of Japanese women’s career path, where they 
are expected to leave their career and opt for motherhood rather than career advancement 
at a certain point. This is because family responsibility usually takes priority over 
employment for women in Japan. This could be a reflection of the widespread view in Japan 
that the priority of women should be family responsibility, rather than career progress.  
The maximum level of female executive representation achieved is about the same for China 
and the US, both being the highest in the combined sample. In addition, Japan has a comparable 





Another interesting observation is that during 2019, UK corporates on an average displayed 
the highest financial performance in terms of ROA level, while those of Japan did the worst. 
Financial performance of Chinese corporates is comparable to those of the US, but higher than 
the German firms considered. From a market sentiment perspective (Tobin’s Q), on average 
level, the sentiment is favourable towards the UK market indicated by the highest Tobin’s Q 
value, which could be justified by its highest financial performance. However, the market 
sentiment towards the Chinese and the US market is comparable, with Japanese market has 
the lowest market valuation. 
Similarly, to the board representation sample, US corporates again display the highest level 
of leverage, and Japanese firms the lowest. Also, as before, Western companies (specifically 
those of the UK and the US) are in general higher leveraged than the Asian companies in the 
sample. For this (2019 only) sample, German firms display a similar level of leverage to 
Japanese. As indicated before, one factor that could play a role here are cultural attitudes 
towards risk. 
The distribution of the female executive presence amongst the sample corporates by country 
in 2019 is shown below. 
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As can be seen, in 2019 around a quarter of US and UK firms had top management teams 
consisting of 25% or more women. At around 19%, China was only slightly lower in this 
regard. At the other extreme, practically all the companies in the German and Japanese 
samples had a female executive presence of less than 25% at the senior management level. A 
full 72.8% of the Japanese firms in the sample had zero female executives. Interestingly, the 
proportion of Chinese firms with female executives is comparable, albeit slightly lower, to 
that of the US or the UK in most ranges (i.e. 0%-25%, 25%-50% and 50%-75%), but with a 
higher proportion of firms having zero female top executives than for the three Western 
nations. 
In general, the overall level of female senior executive presence in the corporates of the three 
Western countries seem to be higher than that of the Asian countries, consistent with the 
observations at board level. The reasons may again include cultural differences in the attitude 
towards women in the workplace. 
4.2 Pearson Correlation 
A useful measure to help the researcher establish an initial understanding of the relationship 
between the variables in an analysis is correlation analysis. A Pearson Correlation Matrix, as 
a power correlation analysis method, may provide useful insights based on the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between variables. This analysis enables the researcher to 
understand any potential correlation that exist amongst the variables. The following sections 
discuss the correlation results for the female board and management representation sections 
of the study, respectively. 
4.2.1 Correlation Matrix for Female Board Representation Analysis 
The table below shows the correlations between the variables considered in the first part of the 
study. 







 FemaleBoard FirmSize BoardSize Leverage ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleBoard 1.000 -0.058 0.006 0.007 0.095 0.096 
FirmSize -0.058 1.000 0.430 0.646 -0.465 -0.709 
BoardSize 0.006 0.430 1.000 0.387 -0.234 -0.252 
Leverage 0.007 0.646 0.387 1.000 -0.425 -0.491 
ROA 0.095 -0.465 -0.234 -0.425 1.000 0.663 










 FemaleBoard FirmSize BoardSize Leverage ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleBoard 1.000 0.283 0.045 0.097 -0.016 0.037 
FirmSize 0.283 1.000 0.295 0.382 -0.223 -0.271 
BoardSize 0.045 0.295 1.000 0.053 -0.047 -0.073 
Leverage 0.097 0.382 0.053 1.000 -0.283 -0.223 
ROA -0.016 -0.223 -0.047 -0.283 1.000 0.547 







 FemaleBoard FirmSize BoardSize Leverage ROA TobinsQ 
FemaleBoard 1.000 0.186 0.066 0.055 0.073 0.034 
FirmSize 0.186 1.000 0.428 0.039 -0.306 -0.481 
BoardSize 0.066 0.428 1.000 0.040 -0.136 -0.174 
Leverage 0.055 0.039 0.040 1.000 0.014 0.031 
ROA 0.073 -0.306 -0.136 0.014 1.000 0.620 







 FemaleBoard FirmSize BoardSize Leverage ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleBoard 1.000 0.073 0.096 0.130 0.120 0.135 
FirmSize 0.073 1.000 0.530 0.251 -0.389 -0.577 
BoardSize 0.096 0.530 1.000 0.109 -0.167 -0.196 
Leverage 0.130 0.251 0.109 1.000 -0.020 0.053 
ROA 0.120 -0.389 -0.167 -0.020 1.000 0.569 







 FemaleBoard FirmSize BoardSize Leverage ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleBoard 1.000 0.213 0.161 -0.014 0.037 0.025 
FirmSize 0.213 1.000 0.414 0.454 -0.615 -0.670 
BoardSize 0.161 0.414 1.000 0.295 -0.175 -0.218 
Leverage -0.014 0.454 0.295 1.000 -0.385 -0.357 
ROA 0.037 -0.615 -0.175 -0.385 1.000 0.739 
Tobin's Q 0.025 -0.670 -0.218 -0.357 0.739 1.000 
 
 
The above correlation matrix reveals that the variable of interest, FemaleBoard (i.e. the 
percentage of women on the board), displays a positive but limited association with firm 
financial performance (ROA) and the market valuation of assets (Tobin’s Q) for most 
countries. This indicates that there may be a positive relationship between female board 
representation and firm performance in a manner, but that the relationship is fairly weak. This 
trend was discovered for nearly all of the countries examined, except for Japan. The 
association between female board representation and firm financial performance in Japan is 
negative and weak, implying that a higher number of women on company boards affect the 
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profitability of Japanese corporates negatively, but in a very limited way. Of the countries 
examined, female board presence seems to have the strongest positive relationship with the 
profitability and market perception in the case of UK corporates, and less so for China, the 
US and Germany. In general, though, the relationship between the level of female board 
presence and firm performance appears fairly weak for all five countries over the sample 
period. This finding is consistent with the findings of previous researchers, such as Erhardt, 
Werbel and Shrader (2003), Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015), and Trinh et.al (2018), 
who all found fairly weak positive relationships between female board presence and firm 
performance. 
Another interesting observation is the stronger but negative relationship that exists between 
most of the control variables and firm performance measures across all five countries. Firm 
size is found to have a strongly negative relationship with both ROA and Tobin’s Q in all 
cases, indicating that small firm generally outperform larger ones. This trend is especially true 
for firms in China, Germany and the UK. This negative association (albeit quite weak) was 
also previously found in the three studies mentioned above. The table also indicates a negative 
association between the firm performance measures. On the one hand, and the size of the 
board and levels of leverage on the other, for most of the countries examined. This was 
consistent with findings by Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), and Terjesen, Couto and 
Francisco (2015), although weaker than that in this study. The exception in this study was the 
US, where a positive association between leverage and firm performance was found, which is 
consistent with the findings of Trinh et.al (2018), both in terms of sign and strength. 
4.2.2 Correlation Matrix for Female Executive Representation Analysis 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix correlation between the variables involved in the female 
executive representation analysis is shown in the table below. 







 FemaleExecutives FirmSize Leverage AssetsTurnover ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleExecutives 1.000 -0.271 -0.097 0.014 0.183 0.250 
FirmSize -0.271 1.000 0.665 -0.310 -0.524 -0.662 
Leverage -0.097 0.665 1.000 -0.415 -0.510 -0.513 
AssetsTurnover 0.014 -0.310 -0.415 1.000 0.323 0.262 
ROA 0.183 -0.524 -0.510 0.323 1.000 0.781 













 FemaleExecutives FirmSize Leverage. AssetsTurnover ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleExecutives 1.000 0.207 0.163 -0.124 0.038 0.132 
FirmSize 0.207 1.000 0.386 -0.503 -0.291 -0.268 
Leverage 0.163 0.386 1.000 -0.373 -0.344 -0.212 
AssetsTurnover -0.124 -0.503 -0.373 1.000 0.225 0.148 
ROA 0.038 -0.291 -0.344 0.225 1.000 0.658 







 FemaleExecutives FirmSize Leverage. AssetsTurnover ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleExecutives 1.000 0.204 0.057 0.061 0.013 -0.018 
FirmSize 0.204 1.000 -0.014 -0.279 -0.408 -0.534 
Leverage 0.057 -0.014 1.000 0.076 0.024 0.034 
AssetsTurnover 0.061 -0.279 0.076 1.000 0.266 0.282 
ROA 0.013 -0.408 0.024 0.266 1.000 0.746 







 FemaleExecutives FirmSize Leverage. AssetsTurnover ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleExecutives 1.000 -0.018 0.335 0.087 0.295 0.213 
FirmSize -0.018 1.000 0.041 -0.409 -0.428 -0.677 
Leverage 0.335 0.041 1.000 0.012 -0.011 0.115 
AssetsTurnover 0.087 -0.409 0.012 1.000 0.418 0.441 
ROA 0.295 -0.428 -0.011 0.418 1.000 0.671 







 FemaleExecutives FirmSize Leverage. AssetsTurnover ROA Tobin's Q 
FemaleExecutives 1.000 0.152 0.097 -0.088 0.179 0.191 
FirmSize 0.152 1.000 0.555 -0.536 -0.675 -0.665 
Leverage 0.097 0.555 1.000 -0.165 -0.444 -0.394 
AssetsTurnover -0.088 -0.536 -0.165 1.000 0.564 0.360 
ROA 0.179 -0.675 -0.444 0.564 1.000 0.751 
Tobin's Q 0.191 -0.665 -0.394 0.360 0.751 1.000 
 
 
In contrast to the female board presence measures discussed above, the percentage of women 
as top executives in firms have a relatively strong and positive relationship with ROA and 
Tobin’s Q for most of the countries in question. UK, German and Chinese firms’ profitability 
levels seem to have the strongest association with this variable. However, US firms display a 
negative and weak relationship between the level of female executives and market valuation 
as measured by Tobin’s Q. This could be an indication that in the US, where female executive 
leadership is well established, the market does not attach as much importance to  this factor 
compared to elsewhere. 
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A similar result is found for the control variables as previously, namely a strongly negative 
association between firm size and firm performances measures (ROA and Tobin’s Q) across 
all countries. This is especially applicable to Germany and China. The level of leverage seems 
to have a relatively weaker but negative relationship with firm performance for the majority 
of the countries, except for the US and the UK, where this variable displays a positive 
relationship with ROA (both), and Tobin’s Q (the US only). Additionally, Assets Turnover 
has a relatively stronger positive impact on ROA and Tobin’s Q across all countries, hence 
justifying its inclusion in the regression model for this section of the study. 
4.3 Regression Results 
In order to comprehensively investigate the relationship between female representation on 
board and executive levels and firm financial and market performance, the methodology 
described in Chapter 3 was followed. This included the construction and testing of various 
regression models in order to test the validity of the hypotheses set out at the start of this study. 
The regression results for the relationship between female board and executive representation 
and firm performance is presented and discussed separately in detail in the sections that 
follow. 
4.3.1 Regression Results for Female Board Representation Effect 
Previous literature6 motivated the importance of female board representation for corporates 
and emphasised the positive impact on firm performance linked to increased female board 
representation. In order to investigate the impact effectively, the most statistically accurate 
model was selected. As discussed in Chapter 3, for all five country data sets, the Random 
Effects Model was found to be the most appropriate model for statistically testing the 
relationship between female board representation and firm performance. 
The table below displays the Random Effect regression modelling results for each variable 
involved in the female board representation effect analysis. As a reminder, FemaleBoard 
denotes the percentage of women on corporate board, Ln (FirmSize) measures the firm size as 
log of total assets, BoardSize is the number of people on a specific corporate board, and 





6 Examples include studies performed by Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Trinh et.al (2018), Reinert, 
Weigert and Winnefeld (2016), and Dezső and Ross (2008) 
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Table 4-8: Regression Results for the Female Board Representation Effect. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
Female presence on board 
0.005 0.028 0.079*** 0.099 0.026 
(-0.248) (-1.101) (-1.994) (-1.186) (-1.115) 
Firm Size 
-0.017*** -0.005*** -0.021*** -0.040*** -0.019*** 
(-8.452) (-3.852) (-9.729) (-4.816) (-5.350) 
Board Size 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002** 
(-0.153) -0.131 -0.3806 (-0.336) -1.828 
Leverage 
-0.003 -0.005*** 0.001** 0.008 0.000 
(-1.024) (-2.488) (-1.7712) (-1.245) (-0.193) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.225 0.093 0.105 0.162 0.374 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
Female board presence 
0.053 0.055 0.095 0.152 -0.111 
(-0.306) (-0.156) (-0.334) (-0.33) (-0.370) 
Firm Size 
-0.265*** -0.090*** -0.197*** -0.242** -0.197*** 
(-10.317) (-6.753) (-11.503) (-9.161) (-4.208) 
Board Size 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.022*** 
(-0.448) (-0.526) (-0.169) (-0.505) (-2.108) 
Leverage 
0.012 0.008 0.003 0.031 0.006 
(-0.422) (-1.009) (-0.646) (-0.915) (-0.37) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.502 0.065 0.234 0.361 0.393 
 




At a high level, the results using the Random Effects models are consistent in sign with the 
results from the majority of past literature, but unlike the latter, not statistically significant for 
female board representation (FemaleBoard) for most of the countries examined, even at the 
10% level of statistical significance, regardless of the firm performance indicator (ROA or 
Tobin’s Q). However, with regards to ROA, the US appears to be the exception as the positive 
correlation of female board representation with the financial performance of American firms 
was found to be statistically significant at the 1% level of statistical significance. Reasons for 
the (generally) different result to many prior findings in terms of statistical significance could 
be due to the sample period in this study being different to those used in most past studies, 
which often consist of only one year, or included an earlier period than used for this study. 
For example, the study done by Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015) only covered 2010, that 
of Dezső and Ross (2008), used 1992 to 2006 as sample period, and Erhardt, Werbel and 
Shrader (2003) studied the period 1993 to 1998. A second possible reason for many published 
studies reporting results with a stronger statistical significance may relate to the methodology 
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used. Thus, it appears that several studies did not apply panel regressions, despite the panel 
nature of data sets used. For example, Rose (2007) used a cross-sectional regression analysis 
on a data set spanning 1998 to 2001. The last possible cause of the different result could be a 
selection bias, in that only studies finding statistically significant relationships between female 
board and senior management representation and firm performances end up being published 
in the literature. 
In all cases, except for the model linking female board representation in Germany to Tobin’s 
Q, the coefficient of FemaleBoard is positive, implying that higher female board 
representation is potentially beneficial to firms’ financial performance level. The magnitude 
of the implied impact on corporate financial performances differ between the countries, 
ranging from around 0.5% on ROA in China to nearly 10% on ROA in the UK. 
On the other hand, when the model is measured against the market sentiment indicator, i.e. 
Tobin’s Q, there is a positive correlation from having higher percentage of women on 
corporate boards for all the countries except for Germany. Again, the strongest positive 
association is found in the UK, and the weakest positive associations for China and Japan. 
However, for Germany the association is negative, implying a negative market perception of 
women on company boards. 
As indicated above, the highest impact from female board representation on firm performance 
appears to be in the UK and the US. This could in part result from the fact that the UK and US 
samples have the highest female board representation level among all countries examined. 
Thus, as per Table 4-2, there was a great improvement in female board representation in the 
US and the UK between 2013 and 2019, with an increasing number of firms having female 
board representation levels of 25%-50%, and even 50%-75%. This is significantly higher than 
the upper limit ten to twenty years ago (Flynn & Adams, 2004; Singh et al., 2001). It is possible 
that a critical level of female board representation is required before women have a significant 
impact on company performance, or the market’s perceptions of the value of the firm. In 
general, the apparent correlation between the different prevalence of female board 
representation cross the five countries and the different impact of this representation on 
company performance measures in different countries could also be indicative of cultural 
effects that possibly limit women’s ability to influence company decisions to different extent 
in the various countries. 
Similarly, the weaker association between female board presence and corporate performance 
for Chinese and Japanese corporates is in the context of a lower level of female board 
representation level compared to the Western countries. Thus, Lam, McGuinnes and Vieito 
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(2012) indicated that only 4.4% of Chinese firms were led by female CEOs. Another survey, 
performed by Terjesan and Singh (2008), also confirmed only 2% female presence on 
Japanese corporate boards. Again, cultural effects and a lack of critical mass within boards 
may limit women’s’ ability to impact company performance. 
In general, the positive relationship between female board presence and firm performance is 
stronger for the US and UK, compared to Germany and the Asian countries. As previously 
discussed, this could be due to underlying cultural differences in how women are perceived in 
different business environments. 
It is important to note that, except for the US in terms of ROA, none of the coefficients on the 
measures of female board representation with regards to firm financial or market performance 
was found to be statistically significant, even at a 10% significance level. However, the positive 
association found throughout is consistent with many previous studies,7 in which researchers 
found a positive relationship between female board presence and firm performance. For 
example, Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) found a positive underlying relationship between 
gender-diversity on corporate boards and corporate financial performance for American 
corporates for a sample covering 1993 to 1998. Trinh et al. (2018) also found strong evidence 
in support of a positive impact of women on UK firm performance. Similar evidence8 was also 
discovered in the Asian countries by previous researchers. However, although a similar 
association was found in this study, the association was weak, and majority were not 
statistically significant. As indicated above, this different result could be due to a different 
sample and sample period, the use of a different methodology (panel regressions), or a selection 
bias in the publication of work in this field. The results of this study (particularly in terms of 
statistical significance) potentially questions some of the previous findings and emphasises the 
need for further investigation of this topic. 
With regards to the control variables, firm size seems to have negative impact on corporate 
performance across the countries examined, as the greater the firm size, the lower both the 
financial and market performance (respectively measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q) in all cases. 
This is consistent with most of the literature. Thus, for example, Moreno-Gomez, Lafuente 
and Vaillant (2017) found a negative relationship between firm size and firm financial 
performance measures using panel regression techniques. However, Terjesen, Couto and 
Francisco (2015) found a weak positive association between firm size and firm performance. 
 
7 Examples include studies performed by Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Trinh et.al (2018), Reinert, 
Weigert and Winnefeld (2016), and Dezső and Ross (2008). 
8 Luo, Xiang and Huang (2017), and Nakagawa and Schreiber (2014) 
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Darmadi (2010), on the other hand, found a statistically significantly positive association 
between firm size and ROA, but a negative, non-significant association between firm size and 
Tobin’s Q. The majority of past studies do, however, find a positive relationship between firm 
size and firm performance9. 
In addition, although the financial performance of firms in UK seem to experience a slight 
negative effect from having a larger board for firm performance (ROA) only, all other country-
specific models show a positive association between financial and market performance and 
board size. This variable was found to be statistically significant for firms in Germany at 5% 
and 1% for ROA and Tobin’s Q measurement respectively, but not for any of the other eight 
country-specific models. This positive but mostly insignificant association was found in line 
with some previous findings by past researchers (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Moreno-
Gomez, Lafuente & Vaillant, 2017; Darmadi, 2010). However, Terjesen, Couto and Francisco 
(2015) also found evidence that board size may negatively affect market sentiment towards 
corporates (i.e. measured by Tobin’s Q) and this relationship was found to be statistically 
significant. But one should note that their study used a single year as test period, which differs 
from most studies. 
Leverage seems to have slight positive impact on financial performance of firms in the US, 
the UK and Germany, but the opposite for China and Japan. However, in terms of the market 
sentiment (Tobin’s Q), leverage is positively associated with market valuation in all cases. 
This variable was found to be statistically significant under financial performance 
measurement (ROA) for firms in Japan and US at 1% and 5% significance level respectively, 
but not for any of the other country-specific models. This contrasts with the previous findings. 
For example, Moreno-Gomez, Lafuente and Vaillant (2017) has found a negatively 
insignificant relationship between leverage and ROA. The different time period (i.e.2008- 
2015) and data set (i.e. Colombian public companies) may drive the difference in findings. 
Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2015) also provided evidence the negative and significant 
association between leverage and ROA, although the insignificant positive association 
between leverage and Tobin’s Q was in line with the study. 
4.3.2 Regression Results for Female Executive Representation Effect 
The results of the regression models were tested to investigate whether female representation 
at senior management level (i.e. top executives) is positively correlated with firm financial 
performance and/or market perception across the five study countries is reported and discussed 
 
9 Examples include Rose (2007), Moreno-Gomez, Lafuente and Vaillant (2017), and Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader 
(2003). 
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in the section that follows. This expands the concept of female impact on firm performance 
beyond the board level, which has been the focus of the vast majority of past studies in this 
area. The consideration of a female top managerial effect may therefore add new insights to 
the discussion of potential female impact on firm performance. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, female executive data was only available for the year 2019, resulting in multivariate 
regression models being used for this part of the study. One should specifically notice that 
Germany only had 28 observations in 2019 due to the data constraint, which could impose 
some limitations on its findings. 
The table below displays the multivariate regression modelling results for each variable 
involved in the female executive (managerial) representation effect analysis. In this case, 
FemaleExecutives denotes the percentage of women acting as top executives in corporates. 
As before, Ln (FirmSize) is the natural logarithm of total firm assets, and Leverage and asset 
turnover were measured through the debt to equity ratio and assets turnover ratio of each firm, 
respectively. 
Table 4-9: Regression Results for Female Executive Representation Effect. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
 
Female presence as Executives 
0.033 0.093 0.043** 0.474 0.111*** 
(1.544) (1.501) (1.958) (1.640) (-2.238) 
 
Firm Size 
-0.010*** -0.004*** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.011*** 
(-4.9363) (-2.087) (-8.982) (-2.698) (-2.460) 
 
Leverage 
-0.014*** -0.006 0.000 -0.014 -0.007 
(-4.116) (-0.972) (0.091) (-0.978) (-1.047) 
 
Assets Turnover 
0.016** 0.004 0.018*** 0.106 0.032*** 
(1.957) (0.548) (2.565) (1.201) (-2.031) 














Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 China Japan US UK Germany 
 
Female presence as Executives 
0.405*** 1.809 0.337** 0.772 1.368*** 
(2.098) (1.221) (1.858) (1.010) (-2.077) 
 
Firm Size 
-0.198*** -0.068*** -0.221*** -0.216*** -0.200*** 
(-8.252) (-2.970) (-11.687) (-4.688) (-3.303) 
 
Leverage 
-0.074*** -0.040*** 0.001 0.036 -0.022 
(-2.309) (-0.976) (0.350) (0.209) (-0.251) 
 
Assets Turnover 
0.055 -0.014 0.130*** 0.219 0.019 
(0.709) (-0.155) (3.000) (0.955) (0.091) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 0.111 0.305 0.511 0.450 
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Compared to the results of the female board representation analysis, the level of female 
executives in corporates show a stronger positive association with firm performance under 
both the financial performance and market sentiment perspectives. This may imply that 
women make more significant contributions to firm performance and market perception in 
senior executive management roles than as board members. In order to understand the impact 
women potentially bring at senior executive level to firms, it is useful to analyse each country 
under both firm performance measurements. 
Under the financial performance perspective, there is a positive correlation between female 
executive representation and ROA for all five countries, which is statistically significant at 
either the 1% or 5% level for the US and Germany, but not for the other countries. The 
strongest association is found for the UK, and the weakest for China. From the market 
sentiment perspective, a very strong association was found between the presence of female 
executives and the Tobin’s Q of firms across the five countries examined, and the results for 
China, the US and Germany were statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level. 
These findings support the hypothesis that companies with a higher female top executive 
presence are rewarded by the market with a higher market value to net asset value (Tobin’s Q) 
in all five countries. However, this effect seems to be the strongest in Japan, where the 
environment for women occupying senior positions was found by Terjesan and Singh (2008) 
to be particularly negative. This is followed by Germany and the UK, with China and the US 
displaying the weakest (but still fairly strong) association. 
Similarly, in the executive management models, the majority of the control variables were also 
found to be statistically significant for both the financial performance and market sentiment 
measurements. 
In both the financial performance and market valuation models, firm size was found to be 
inversely related to firm performance, in all cases with a statistical significance of 1% or 
better. Thus, the larger firms in the sample generally seem to experience lower levels of 
financial performance. The impact of this variable is generally quite small in the financial 
performance models, but somewhat greater in those focussed on market valuations. This result 
is consistent with that of Dezső and Ross (2008), who found a negative but weaker association 
between Tobin’s Q and firm size in their study. On the other hand, Darmadi (2010), using data 
of Indonesian listed firms for the pre-global-financial-crisis period, found that larger firm tend 
to perform better financially and achieve higher ROAs, albeit for a very specific data set. 
Whether investors value assets in smaller firms higher, as found in this study, therefore 
remains a topic worth examining further. 
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The results for the relationship between levels of leverage and firm performance was more 
mixed, with an inverse relationship found for both firm performance measures (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q) for China, Germany and Japan, a very weak positive relationship for the US, and 
differing signs for the UK under the two performance measures. However, these results were 
only found to be statistically significant for the Chinese and Japanese corporates. This finding 
was similar to those of Dezső and Ross (2008), who discovered a negative but stronger 
relationship in their study. Although the impact of leverage on firm performance varied in 
this study, the overall tendency was towards a negative impact. 
Asset turnover was found to be a statistically significant variable (1% level of significance) 
for all regions except for Japan and UK in the financial performance models, but only for the 
US in the Tobin’s Q models. A positive association was found for this variable in all cases, 
except for the Japan Tobin’s Q model. Both Muritala (2012) and Pouraghajan and Malekian 
(2012) also found evidence that asset turnover is positively related to firm performance. The 
general conclusion is therefore that a more efficient use of assets results in both better financial 
performances, and the market valuation of assets. 
4.3.3 Comparing the Results of the Female Board and Executive Representation Effects It is 
further useful to compare the results of the regressions testing the correlation between 
female board and executive presence with firm results. Although female board representation 
was found to have a positive impact on firm performance both from the financial performance 
and market sentiment perspectives across all the countries tested, these results were not 
statistically significant except for the case of US under financial performance measurement. 
However, the results for female executive representation was found to be highly statistically 
significant (for the US, Germany and China) and positively associated with both corporate 
financial performance and market rating. In particular, the results do not provide sufficient 
evidence to suggest that having more women on corporate boards improves corporate financial 
performance, or boost market sentiment towards firms, except for American firms. However, 
the hypothesis that more women executives improves firm profitability and investors’ 
valuation of firm assets is statistically supported by the results for firms in the US and 
Germany, and for Chinese firms under market rating perspective. This implies that women 
significantly contribute to corporate results through being in senior executive positions, but 
not necessarily through their presence on corporate boards other than American firms ‘boards. 
A possible reason could be that women’s judgements and decision making powers may be 
reduced when they are part of the corporate board due to possible compromises or the 
dominating influence of the male directors, especially, as is mostly the case, where women 
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are in a small minority in corporate boards. However, as senior executives, women have more 
autonomy and power to make decisions and influence company actions and would rely more 
on their own judgement. The characteristics Del Giudice (2015: 753) suggests that women 
may possess, such as detail-orientation, empathy and caution, could also have a larger impact 
on firms at an executive level, due to the more operationally focused responsibility these roles 
entail. 
This finding suggests that firms could benefit from an increase in the number of women acting 
as senior executives, and that the focus should be on this aspect of female representation rather 
than an incremental increase in female board presence. 
4.4 Interpretation in terms of Potential Cultural Effects 
The findings of the descriptive statistics, as well as of the regression models for both female 
board and female top executive correlations with firm performance, can be interpreted within 
the context of cultural differences between the various countries. 
The extent of the association between female board representation and corporate performance 
varies across the countries studied. As was discussed in Chapter 2, under different cultural 
environments, women may behave differently, and have different impacts, within the 
workplace. This suggests that the cultural differences between the regions could affect the 
extent to which female’s representation influences corporate performance. Thus, it is worth 
comparing and analysing the results of this study across countries with different cultural and 
value systems. 
The underlying hypothesis is that in a more open-minded environment, women may be more 
encouraged to contribute their specific views and skills, which in turn could impact such 
corporates differently to those solely dominated by men. The expectation is that this may be 
more the case in countries such as the US or the UK or Germany, compared to conservative 
environments which may discourage the empowerment of women and cause them to restrain 
themselves from contributing significantly. Examples of the latter, to varying degrees, may 
include China and Japan. 
4.4.1 Female Board Representation Impact and Culture 
From a descriptive statistics perspective, female representation at board level in the Western 
corporates was found to be larger than that in the Asian ones. Thus, the sample firms in the 
three Western nations (the US, the UK and the Germany) achieved a rate of female board 
representation that is almost double the rate in Chinese corporates, and five times that of the 
Japanese firms. This difference in female board representation can possibly be explained by 
cultural differences that exist across the various regions, i.e. the attitudes towards women’s 
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roles in corporates based on the different the Western and Asian cultural perspectives. This 
could affect female representation at senior levels in corporates, and the more reserved Asian 
cultures may also affect their empowerment and behaviour within firms. 
As expected, the UK seems to display the strongest impact on firm performance from the 
empowerment of women in board positions, followed by the US. Although the US and the 
UK have different cultural systems, they both value the equality of opportunity, individualism 
and independence. This cultural environment may allow women to voice opinions more 
openly and pursue senior positions more freely, at least compared to the other countries in the 
study. Thus, it could be expected that in these cultural environments, the relationship between 
female representation and firm performance could be stronger. Similarly, on a comparative 
basis, the evidence from the Tobin’s Q models seem to indicate that the market tends to favour 
firms with higher female board representation more in the US and the UK compared to the 
other countries studied. 
Germany is an interesting case. In the sample Germany displayed the highest average female 
board representation (at around 25%), which is above that of the UK (around 24%) and the 
US (approximately 22%). Despite this, the coefficient of female board representation with 
regards to firm financial performance was substantially lower for Germany, compared to the 
latter two countries. Thus, even though within the study sample female representation on 
German firm boards were comparatively high, the evidence seems to indicate that their impact 
is relatively weak. A possible cause could be the rather conservative system of values within 
German corporates, which may hinder their ability to have an impact within the firm board 
environment. Further, with regards to the Tobin’s Q model, Germany was the only country to 
display a negative relationship between female board representation and the market valuation 
of firms. Thus, the external environment in Germany does not seem to encourage the 
promotion of gender equality either, as investors seem to value German corporates with more 
women on corporate boards less. 
Female board representation in the sample is significantly lower for the Asian countries, at just 
less than 11% for China and less than 5% for Japan. This is indicative of cultural biases in 
these countries. The estimate of the female board representation effect for both China and 
Japan are further far lower than that of both the US and the UK. As indicated in Chapter 2, 
China upholds modesty and emphasises relationships and, as a result, Chinese women may 
tend to restrain themselves from voicing opinions openly and display a humbler behaviour at 
workplace. This could explain the lower level of financial performance improvement 
associated with Chinese corporates with increased female board representation. Japan similarly 
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has a very conservative male-dominated culture, highly valuing modest and polite individuals, 
and not generally encouraging female participation at a higher corporate level, as indicated by 
the female board participation numbers above. This could explain the weak relationship 
between firm financial performance and female board representation in Japan. 
4.4.2 Female Top Executive Representation Impact and Culture 
While board level decisions affect strategy, top executive management decisions affect 
operational actions and implementation. The skills required therefore differ between board 
and management levels. Further, women in senior executive positions have more freedom to 
impact company actions than women on boards, where they function as part of a committee 
where they are typically in a minority. 
From the descriptive statistics perspective, organisations in the UK and the US again achieve 
a higher female top executive representation rate than that of China and Japan. However, in 
this case, German female representation is lower than the US and the UK. As in the case of the 
corporate board comparison, Japan again achieved a significantly lower level of women’s 
representation at top executive level than the other countries studied. As indicated before, this 
could partly be linked to the unfavourable attitude towards women in corporates that is rooted 
in Japanese culture, as argued by Allen and Sakamoto (1999). 
The evidence from the regressions described above is more surprising with regards to the 
possible impact of female senior executive representation on firm performance. With regards 
to financial performance, although the highest coefficient is still found for the UK, in this case 
Germany and Japan follows, with the US and China displaying the weakest links. These results 
are not entirely consistent with the theory regarding the cultural differences between the five 
countries. The most surprising results are the high coefficients for Japan and Germany. The 
latter may be due to the very small sample size of 28 companies, which may not be fully 
representative of the German economy, which the Japanese result could be skewed by the great 
majority of Japanese companies (73% of the sample) that have no female executives at senior 
level at all. This statistic supports the view of Japan as a male-dominated culture, including in 
the business world. A further finding is that the Tobin’s Q for Japan displays the greatest 
sensitivity to an increase in women in top executive management positions, possibly because 
the base is quite low and, from the market’s perspective, companies with women in top 
management really stand out. In addition, the trend discovered in Japanese companies could 
be considered as a future research direction, particularly when more data become available.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Women are still significantly underrepresented in corporate leadership positions, but gender- 
diversity in corporates may have an impact on firm financial performance. Specifically, 
women are thought to, in general, have a collaborative leadership style that improves team 
cohesiveness, and improves corporate strategic decisions through prudence and humanisation 
(Garfinkle, 2016). The impact of a greater female presence in firm leadership could result 
from both the board and top executive levels, with the former affecting corporate strategic 
decision making, and the latter firm actions at a more operational level (Barlow, 2016). There 
is some academic evidence of a correlation between female representation at both the board 
and top executive level and corporate financial performance10. 
This study investigated the relationship between female representation corporate boards and 
top executive levels, by performing regressions on data from listed corporates in China, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. Consistent with most past studies, a positive association 
was discovered between female’s board presence and corporate financial performance and 
market valuation. However, except for the case of the US under the financial performance 
perspective, the majority of the positive associations were not found to be statistically 
significant, thus failing to provide compelling evidence for the hypothesis that greater female 
representation in corporate leadership is associated with better corporate performance. 
As in the case of female board representation, female representation at top executive level was 
found to be positively correlated with corporate performance, both from the financial and 
market valuation perspectives. In addition, this positive association was found to be 
statistically significant for the US, Germany and China, but not for Japan and the UK, which 
is partially consistent with the hypothesis that greater representation of women as top 
executives positively impacts corporate performance. Thus, the evidence suggest that women 
representation may have a greater impact at the operational level compared to the strategic 
level in the US, Germany and China, but the difference is not as clear for the UK and Japan. 
Possible reasons for this could be that board decisions are joint decisions, and that in order to 
have a real impact on these decisions there could be a minimum threshold required level of 
female representation. Thus, for example, Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013) showed that a 
significant positive relationship with firm performance in observed only when 30% or more 
of directors are women. On the other hand, top executives generally have far more personal 
autonomy and authority in decision-making, and thus may have a more direct impact. 
 
10 Examples include studies performed by Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Trinh et.al (2018), Luo, Xiang and Huang 
(2017), Reinert, Weigert and Winnefeld (2016), and Dezső and Ross (2008). 
59  
Although greater female representation in positions of corporate leadership may potentially 
benefit organisations at both the strategic and operational levels, the extent of this impact could 
vary across countries as a result of different cultural attitudes towards gender roles and 
identities. In this study, this theory was investigated by comparing the strength of association 
between female board and top executive level representation and firm performance measures 
in the context of selected Asian (China and Japan) and Western (Germany, the UK, and the 
US) cultures. In terms of descriptive statistics, within the sample it seems that women in the 
three Western countries tend to have a greater level of representation at the board and top 
executive level than for the Asian countries. 
The positive association between female board representation and firm performance tends to 
be stronger in the Western than the Asian sample countries, but this does not necessarily apply 
at the female executive level, where the findings are more mixed between the various cultures. 
This variation in correlation between female representation and firm performance could be 
driven by cultural differences between the societies from which the sample was drawn. Thus, 
in more open-minded cultures with a respect for gender-equality (i.e. Western cultures in this 
study), women may be able to raise their opinions more freely and have greater impact on 
organisations. On the other hand, in more conservative value systems (e.g. Asian cultures), 
women’s behaviour and influence may be more constrained. This cross-country investigation 
of the correlation between female representation in business leadership and firm performance, 
with specific consideration of culture, has to the author’s knowledge not been done before. 
This study finds some evidence, although not conclusive, of a positive impact of female 
representation at top executive level in particular, on the performance of the listed firms across 
three Western and two Asian countries. This is an extension if the current knowledge in this 
field, which has mostly focused on board level female representation. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the results of this study highlights the possible effects of cultural contexts on the 
influence and impact of female leaders in corporates across different countries. As a more 
open-minded culture encourages a freer expression of female opinions and actions within a 
corporate environment, firms should consider developing a more open culture that is 
encourages women to express themselves. In view of the results of this study with regards to 
women at top executive level, firm should further consider developing women into roles of 
firm leadership at executive level. 
The above findings would thus have the following implications. Given the evidence of a 
possible positive impact of female representation in business leadership on firm performance 
found in this study, the implications is that firms should consider promoting more women to 
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corporate board and top management level to achieve greater success. In addition, cultural 
norms may have an effect on female leaders’ influence in corporates. Therefore, corporates 
may need to establish and develop a more open-minded culture in order to encourage women 
to express their opinions and have greater influence on decision making.  
However, the findings of this study are incomplete, particularly with regards to the 
investigation at the executive level. This represents an opportunity for further research on the 
impact of female executive representation in corporates on firm performance once more data 
becomes available. In addition, the minimum threshold of female board or executive 
representation required in order to impact firm performance is an area of potential future 
research. Lastly, hypotheses such as that firms with more female directors or executives may 
be more likely to be free of problematic issues such as compensation and communication 
problems and male-dominated clubs, and promote transparency, all of which may result in 
better firm performance, could be considered as potential areas for future research.  
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APPENDIX A: MODEL SELECTION TESTS 
Table A-1: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects model vs Pooled OLS model 
 





ROA Tobin's Q 
China 30.906*** 36.547*** 
Japan 21.472*** 43.109*** 
US 15.816*** 25.04*** 
UK 4.6868*** 23.211*** 
Germany 11.503*** 13.865*** 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table A-2: F-Test for Random Effects model vs Pooled OLS model 





ROA Tobin's Q 
China 8.2544*** 12.244*** 
Japan 5.5879*** 29.817*** 
US 3.7893*** 17.577*** 
UK 15.295*** 28.852*** 
Germany 9.3944*** 26.673*** 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table A-3: Hausman Specific Test for Random Effects model vs Pooled OLS model 




ROA Tobin's Q 
China 0.30912 1.2267 
Japan 1.173 3.3191 
US 1.1926 1.053 
UK 0.013218 0.65018 
Germany 0.01008 0.02783 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
Table B-1: Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation (autocorrelation) in panel 
models 





ROA Tobin's Q 
China 401.19*** 548.44*** 
Japan 246.7*** 659.4*** 
US 126.89*** 304.2*** 
UK 3.7318** 180.38*** 
Germany 50.651*** 88.144*** 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table B-2: Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation (autocorrelation) in multiple regression 
models 





ROA Tobin's Q 
China 1.6972*** 1.4016*** 
Japan 1.6293*** 1.3272*** 
US 2.05 2.0328 
UK 1.7503 1.5468** 
Germany 1.4117* 2.0104 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table B-3: Breusch-Pagan test for homoskedasticity in panel models 




ROA Tobin's Q 
China 227.37*** 91.112*** 
Japan 123.71*** 162.94*** 
US 26.634*** 41.967*** 
UK 1338*** 143.87*** 
Germany 5.7761 27.756*** 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
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Table B-4: Breusch-Pagan test for homoskedasticity in multiple regression models 




ROA Tobin's Q 
China 48.406*** 28.607*** 
Japan 38.013*** 50.777*** 
US 27.964*** 22.311*** 
UK 440.79*** 36.837*** 
Germany 1.3698 4.9177 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table B-5: Shapiro-Wilk test for normality in residuals in panel models 




ROA Tobin's Q 
China 0.90508*** 0.92971*** 
Japan 0.87676*** 0.91235*** 
US 0.88872*** 0.95544*** 
UK 0.59105*** 0.97202*** 
Germany 0.94889*** 0.98964 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
 
 
Table B-6: Shapiro-Wilk test for normality in residuals in multiple regression models 




ROA Tobin's Q 
China 0.93542*** 0.93311*** 
Japan 0.93783*** 0.84897*** 
US 0.92232*** 0.96646*** 
UK 0.67762*** 0.95624*** 
Germany 0.94096** 0.96987 
* Statistical significance <0.10, ** Statistical significance <0.05, *** Statistical significance <0.01 
